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Charles Cronin*
ABSTRACT

The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA) broadened
general copyright protection under U.S. law by granting to artists who
have created certain copyrightable physical works of visual art, the
moral rights of attribution and integrity. Since the time of VARA's
enactment (and for some time before) many artists have worked with
unconventional genres and media to produce art that is not
comfortably accommodated among the visual art works contemplated
by VARA. An increasing number of recent works of Conceptual and
Appropriationist Art raise doubts about fixation and original
expression, both of which are required for copyrightability which, in
turn, is requiredfor a work to be protected under VARA.
This article discusses the uncomfortable fit of VARA and many
contemporary works of art, particularly those that incorporate to a
significant degree living objects in their naturalstate. It focuses on the
recent dispute involving a VARA claim in a living landscape (Kelley v.
Chicago Park District) and discusses similar works of art in which
living elements play a critical role in contributingto the meaning and
aesthetic value of the work. It argues that in these works, and indeed

MIMS, Berkeley, 1997; Ph.D., Musicology, Stanford University, 1993; M.A.,
Musicology, Stanford University, 1989; J.D., American University, 1985; B.A., Musicology,
Oberlin, 1980. Charles Cronin is propritaireof Buoyant Farm, a floral essential oil extraction
enterprise in Santa Barbara County. He can be reached at cpdcronin@earthlink.net. Many
thanks to Robert Carlucci at Yale Art and Architecture Library for his thoughtful input on this
piece.

209

VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 12:2:209

in Conceptual Art in general, authorial contributions tend to be
ideational rather than expressive, and that the application to them of
copyright rights and moral rights is both unnecessary and undesirable
in promoting a productive and imaginative cultural milieu.
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Poems are made by fools like me,
But only God can make a tree.
-Joyce Kilmer

1

In "Of Property," the fifth chapter of the second of his Two
Treatises of Government, John Locke argues that the application of
human labor to commonly held resources gives rise to private property
rights in the fruits of this labor: "Whatsoever then he removes out of
the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his
labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby

1.
JOYCE KILMER, Trees, in POEMS, ESSAYS AND LETTERS IN Two VOLUMES, VOLUME
ONE: MEMOIR AND POEMS 180 (1918).
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makes it his property." 2

Locke's justifications for personal property

inform the U.S. copyright regime that, for over two hundred years, has
granted private property rights in works of human intellect ranging
from literature and music to computer programs, motion pictures, and

works

in

other

media

quite

unknown

to

Locke

and

his

3

contemporaries.
Locke made his arguments using lessons drawn
from nature that resonate even today, despite the remove of our lives

from the agrarian world of seventeenth century England. The recent
federal district court decision in Kelley v. Chicago Park District in
Chapman Kelley v. Chicago Park District is somewhat ironic,
therefore, insofar as it denied copyright protection to the product of
the very labor that Locke used to make his point about personal
4
property-cultivating a garden.

The property in question in Kelley was not the fruits and
flowers typically associated with Locke's discussion of agricultural or
horticultural labor, but rather was the aesthetic result of the
combination of colors and textures of the millions of living leaves and

blooms of Chapman Kelley's Wildflower Works. 5 A professional artist
specializing in representational works depicting scenes of nature-and
of flowers in particular-Kelley created Wildflower Works in 1984 in
Chicago. 6 Wildflower Works occupied one-and-a-half acres of Chicago's
Grant Park, comprising two enormous ovoid beds of wild flowers that
were defined by gravel paths.7
In Chicago and beyond, the general public initially received
Wildflower Works enthusiastically. 8
Within a few years of its
installation, however, public enthusiasm for this work began to wane,

2.
JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 305-06 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1970) (1690). Presumably unlike Locke, unless clearly referring to a male,
"he" means "he or she." See id.
3.
See Robert P. Merges, Locke for the Masses: Property Rights and the Products of
Collective Creativity, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1179, 1182 (2008) (summarizing the correlation of
Locke's property theories to the foundations of American copyright law).
4.
Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., No. 04 C 07715, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75791, at *16
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2008).
5.
See id. at *3.
6.
See id.
7.
See id. Chapman Kelley has posted his sketch for the project and photos of its
realization at http://www.chapmankelley.com. Kelley's posted photos of the project, presumably
showing it looking its best, suggest the realized work never quite matched the idealized
colorfully dappled sketches for it. See Chapman Kelley Portfolio, http://www.chapmankelley.com
(last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
8.
The court took note of the fact that the work was commended by a number of
journalists writing for national newspapers, including the New York Times and the Christian
Science Monitor. See Kelley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75791, at *4-5.
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along with its constituent living plants whose visual appeal wilted
over the natural course of their finite lives. 9 Twenty years after
Wildflower Works's installation, Chicago Park District officials
determined that the project had deteriorated into an unsightly
nuisance.1 0
Over Kelley's objections, these officials radically
redesigned and reduced the space it occupied in Grant Park,
essentially extirpating the work."1
Kelley claimed that the Park District's action was an
unauthorized destruction of a work of recognized stature, which
violated his moral rights in Wildflower Works as established under the
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA). 12 The district court agreed
with Kelley's claim that Wildflower Works was a work of visual art
that one might legitimately classify as a painting or sculpture.13 The
court went on to note, however, that § 106(a) of the Copyright Act,
which promulgates moral rights, limits their application to
copyrightable works only. 14 Wildflower Works may well be a work of
art, but, in the district court's opinion, two plant-filled ellipses did not
evince sufficient original expression for this work to be eligible for
copyright protection. 5 The court further found that, even if it were
copyrightable, Wildflower Works could not provide a basis for moral
rights to Kelley because case law precedent had established that "sitespecific" pieces of visual art like Wildflower Works are ineligible for
protection under the moral rights provision of the Copyright Act. 16
The district court's conclusion that Wildflower Works was not
copyrightable expression was surprisingly brusque given its more
sympathetic stance toward Kelley in its statement that Wildflower
Works was a work of art as both a painting and a sculpture.
Rationalizing its decision that the work was not copyrightable, the
court took a slightly blinkered view of the concept of originality
required for copyright protection when it complained that "Kelley
leaves this Court to assume that he is the first person to ever conceive
of and express an arrangement of growing wildflowers in ellipse9.
See Deanna Isaacs, Is Gardening an Art?, CHICAGO READER, June 16, 2006, at 2.
10.
See id.
11.
See id. at 8-9.
12.
Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title VI, 104 Stat.
5128 (1990). VARA provides limited moral rights of integrity and attribution to authors of
copyrightable works of fine art. For a discussion of the origins and limited scope of VARA, see
infra note 19 and accompanying text.
13.
See Kelley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75791, at *10-16.
14.
See id. at *18.
15.
See id. at *16-17.
16.
See id. at *18-21.
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shaped enclosed area in the manner in which he created his exhibit."'17
In fact, whether Chapman Kelley was the first or the hundred-andfirst artist to create such a work does not legally determine whether
his garden design originated with him, a determination that is
required before copyright may attach. 18
The court's handling of the question of whether Wildflower
Works was a work of visual art within the purview of statutory moral
rights, however, touches upon a broader issue addressed in this
Article. Defending its finding that Wildflower Works was a painting
and a sculpture, the court rejected the Park District's argument that
the "plain and ordinary meaning" of these terms could not possibly
accommodate a living garden:
There is a tension between the law and the evolution of ideas in modern or avant garde
art; the former requires legislatures to taxonomize artistic creations, whereas the latter
is occupied with expanding the definition of what we accept to be art. While Andy
Warhol's suggestion that "art is whatever you can get away with" is too nihilistic for the
law to accommodate, neither should VARA be read so narrowly as to protect only the
most revered work of the Old Masters. In other words,
the "plain and ordinary"
19
meanings of words describing modern art are still slippery.

As the court noted, the tension between copyright law and art
20
particularly involves new or recent works of art like Kelley's piece.
Wildflower Works is only one example of a great number of recent
works of Conceptual art composed of heterodox media extending far
beyond the paints and charcoals of traditional artists. Since the late
nineteenth
century, when Impressionist painters challenged
established tenets of Western art, works associated with many artistic
movements that followed have, like Wildflower Works, become
increasingly problematic in terms of eligibility for copyright protection
under U.S. law.
Following the Impressionist era, the aesthetic meaning of
works labeled Post-Impressionist, Cubist, Expressionist, Conceptual,
Abstract, Minimalist, Appropriationist has tended to reflect more the
idiosyncrasies of a particular artist rather than the intentions or
tastes of a commissioning party or potential buyer. 21 Along with this

17.
Id. at *17.
18.
Resorting to Learned Hand's well-worn comment on originality: " [I]f by some magic
a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be
an 'author,' and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they might of
course copy Keats's." Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936).
19.
Kelley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75791, at *11.
20.
Id.

21.
See JAMES GARDNER, CULTURE OR TRASH? A PROVOCATIVE VIEW OF CONTEMPORARY
PAINTING, SCULPTURE, AND OTHER COSTLY COMMODITIES 22 47 (1993).
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general trend has come the expansion of media in which artists render
their work, which now include living-and once living-objects like
22
plants, animals, and other relatively ephemeral organic materials.
These developments in the visual arts, which have mainly occurred
within the past fifty years, have led to artistic endeavors that U.S.
copyright law does not comfortably accommodate-even though
copyright law ostensibly fosters and protects the results of such
creative enterprise.2 3 This remains true despite amendments to the
Copyright Act enacted as recently as 1990 that expanded protection
24
for works of visual art and architecture.
This Article explores the tension that the Kelley court
identified between copyright law and certain works of contemporary
art. Part I provides an overview of the protection that U.S. copyright
law offers works of visual art, focusing on how VARA fits within the
scheme of copyright law. Part II follows with a broad review of
important movements in visual arts over the past century and
includes a discussion of how works of these movements challenge our
notions of copyrightable material. Part III examines the genre of
Conceptual art that uses living media, and the quandaries that this
type of art raises in regard to the copyright fundamentals of fixation,
authorship, and expression. Part IV suggests that the moral rights
that VARA provides should not apply to these works and,
furthermore, that even copyright protection for many works in
contemporary genres of visual art is neither necessary nor desirable.
Fixation, authorship, and expression are fluid concepts in copyright.
This Article suggests, however, that providing copyright protection to
volatile works of visual art-in particular, to living works of art in
which chance and nature hold the laboring oar-could so dilute these
copyright prerequisites as to risk the monopolization of concepts and
ideas that U.S. copyright law expressly does not protect.

22.
See, e.g., Penelope Green, At Home With Hope Sandrou: FeatheringHer Nest, N.Y.
TIMES, July 16, 2009, at DI (discussing mixed media artist Hope Sandrow's "fowl focused" art
installation that includes live feeds from four Web cams and "painterly poultry portraits and
ecru-hued eggs whose parentage has been fastidiously documented.").
23.
U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8 ('Congress shall have the power ... [t]o promote the progress
of science and useful arts.").
24.
See Visual Arts Rights Act (VARA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title VI, 104 Stat.
5128 (1990); Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title
VII, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990).

2010]

LIVING AND CONCEPTUAL ART AND VARA

I. COPYRIGHT AND MORAL RIGHTS IN THE U.S. FOR VISUAL ART WORKS

A. Background of VARA
Since VARA's enactment in 1991, federal court judges and
scholars have found the Act to be a mostly indigestible addition to
American copyright law.25 Such a conclusion is unsurprising given the
predictably curdled result of combining a concept grounded in authorcentric copyright regimes of civil law countries with the more user26
oriented and economically based copyright law of the United States.
The ethical responsibility to recognize an individual's
expression as an extension of their personality can be traced to
Ancient Greece and Rome.27 Modern societies' notions about such
ethical considerations, or "moral rights" of authors, however, are
grounded in the Berne Convention-an outgrowth of nineteenth
28
century French literary and political thought.
The text of the founding Berne Convention, published in 1886,
promotes authors' rights by establishing the principle of national
treatment, according to which Convention adherents agree to protect
the works of authors of other Convention member states. 29 Authors'
rights under the Convention were not amplified to include moral
rights of integrity and attribution, however, until forty years after

25.
In 2006, the First Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a district court's holding in
favor of the plaintiff, referring to the ambiguity inherent in VARA regarding whether moral
rights may apply to site-specific works of art. See Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459
F.3d 128, 140 (1st Cir. 2006). "Either VARA recognizes site-specific art and protects it, or it does
not recognize site-specific art at all." Id. Furthermore, David and Melvin Nimmer have remarked
on the confusion resulting from inserting protection for material property into law concerned
with protection of immaterial works, stating that "[a]t the abstract (or perhaps fustian) level,
traditional copyright law protects art; by contrast, the Visual Artists Rights Act protects
artifacts." DAVID & MELVIN NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.06 (2009).

26.
Moral rights apart, the rights granted under common law copyright and those of civil
law authors' rights tend to have a great deal in common. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT 4 (2001) (noting that the Berne Convention bridges the two traditions).
27.
See Cheryl Swack, Safeguarding Artistic Creation and the Cultural Heritage: A
Comparison of Droit Moral Between France and the United States, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
361, 367 (tracing the moral concept of authorial recognition to the reign of Emperor Justinian).
28.
See generally, SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS 1886

1986 (1987).

29.
See Barbara Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copyright - Past,
Present, and Future, 56 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1053 (1968) (explaining national treatment as an
understanding that "I'll protect your works to the same extent I protect my own works, if you
promise to do the same .... Perhaps it is no accident that the emergence of the international
copyright concept coincided historically with the development of steamships, locomotives, and
telegraphy.").
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Berne's founding.3 0 The rights of integrity and attribution are the two
rights that VARA provides, albeit only for certain classes of works of
3
visual art. 1
Reflecting their Romantic and Victorian era origins, national
moral rights laws promulgated pursuant to Berne ostensibly
champion the interests of individual authors over those of their
readers.3 2 The moral rights of integrity and attribution are not so
named because they are inherently moral than are copyrights of
reproduction and performance. We refer to them as "moral" because
they are intended to address authors' concerns that lie beyond the
economic and material interests that copyright law protects; moral
33
rights transcend commercial mechanisms of contract and sale.
Commentators have noted, however, that international,
national, and state moral rights laws foster the preservation of
valuable human expression, thus benefiting the larger populations
that they govern. 34 The right of attribution safeguards the public
35
record of authorship existing between the creator and his work.
Even after transferring title to a work, the artist has the affirmative
right to insist that his name appear as the author of the work as well
as the right to disassociate his name from a work he did not create or

30.
See ELIZABETH ADENEY, THE MORAL RIGHTS OF AUTHORS AND PERFORMERS: AN
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 115-121 (2006).
31.
While these rights were expressly rejected by the U.S. under the Berne
Implementation Act of 1988, they were incorporated into U.S. copyright law under VARA. The
House Report prepared for VARA explains that,
While the Berne Convention implementation debate crystallized attempts by artists to
obtain protection for their creations, efforts to enact artists' rights laws had begun
well before that time. Bills seeking to protect visual artists dated from 1979, and H.R.
2400, introduced in the 100th Congress, was designed to grant film directors and
screenwriters certain moral rights. Adherence to the Convention did not end the
efforts in support of these and similar bills.
H. REP. NO. 101-514 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6918.
32.
See Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship,"
41 DUKE L.J. 455 (1991) ("Law's reception of 'authorship' began well before the heyday of
Romanticism in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries ... [b]ut it is not coincidental
that precisely this period saw the articulation of many doctrinal structures that dominate
copyright today.").
33.
See generally NIMMER, supra note 25, at § 8D.06.
34.
See J. H. Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CAL. L. REV. 339,
(1989) (discussing the "dual purpose" of national and international laws protecting moral rights
to protect artists against damage to their work, and also to protect the public against destruction
of the larger culture to which artists contribute); Burton Ong, Why Moral Rights Matter:
Recognizing the Intrinsic Value of Integrity Rights, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 297 (2002) (noting
that the preservation of art works as part of America's cultural patrimony was a pervasive theme
in the Congressional debate over VARA).
35.
See NIMMER, supra note 25, at § 8D.03.
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that has been modified.3 6 The right of integrity protects the dignity
and reputation of artists by prohibiting intentional or neglectful harm
that leaves their physical works of art in a state that demeans their
creators. 37 In this respect, moral rights are ultimately akin to
intellectual property rights in that the objective of both is to balance
the interests of authors and users to promote societies' intellectual
38
productivity.
After World War II, the United States became the largest
exporter of works of intellectual property.3 9 In the late twentieth
century, the United States hoped that joining Berne would help the
country muster greater foreign support for U.S. efforts to counter
rampant piracy of these exports abroad.4 0 The United States joined
Berne in 1989 and, two years later, through the enactment of VARA,
complied with the Convention's stipulation that members provide
41
moral rights to authors.
While American media and software industries supported U.S.
Berne membership insofar as it offered the possibility of greater
protection overseas for their works, these industries were more
skittish, however, about the moral rights legislation arriving
inevitably in the wake of Berne accession. 42 They feared that such

36.
Id.
37.
See id.
38.
The objective of moral rights laws is, therefore, analogous to those of laws governing
access to natural resources (e.g., water, air, radio frequencies spectrum) that aim to prevent or
mitigate the "tragedy of the commons." By restricting an individual's use of artistic resources,
even those whose title rests with the individual, the law promotes the retention for future
generations of a rich record of artistic activity.
39.
See Nicole Telecki, The Role of Special 301 in the Development in International
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights after the Uruguay Round, 14 B.U. INT'L. L.J. 187 (1996)
(noting the steady increase in U.S. trade in intellectual property since the 1947 General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trades).
40.
See Ringer, supra note 29.
41.
See Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title VI, 104
Stat. 5128 (1990).
42.
"[I]n the view of many commentators adherence to Berne will work a gradual but
appreciable change in the American copyright system by exposing it to the continuing influence
of Continental copyright doctrine." Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement
of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDoZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 1, 4 (1992); see also JOHN WHICHER, THE CREATIVE ARTS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 4 (1965)

(arguing-many years before U.S. accession to Berne-against the importation of "an entire body
of foreign law" into the U.S. precedent-based system): see also Melville Nimmer, Implications of
the Prospective Revisions of the Berne Convention and the United States Copyright Law, 19 STAN.
L. REV. 499, 524 (1966-67) (noting that interest groups, "primarily the motion picture and
television industries," opposed U.S. accession to Berne because they feared it would establish
inalienable moral rights not susceptible to contractual modification); Robert C. Bird, Moral
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legislation might upset the long-established rapport between U.S.
media companies and their creative employees. Moral rights might
provide these employees means by which they might obstruct
exploitation of their works by their employers. Ultimately, these
industries' objections shaped moral rights legislation in the United
States, as can be seen in the limited reach of VARA. As its name
implies, VARA provides moral rights of integrity and attribution only
to creators of works of fine art that are meant to be distributed and
43
exhibited as "originals."
VARA's narrow definition of "visual art" excludes not only
44
works made for hire, but also all works of a commercial nature.
Unlike copyright's term of protection-life of the author plus seventy
years-VARA's term is relatively meager, lasting only for the life of
the author. 4 The reach of this statute is further hemmed in by
exceptions and limitations-for example, the public display exception
allowing unauthorized modifications to VARA-eligible workssuggesting that Congress was begrudging and dubious about its
46
enactment.
B. Cases Involving VARA
A "Solomonic compromise between many conflicting interests,"
VARA has, unsurprisingly, displeased virtually everyone who has
worked with this law over the past eighteen years. 47 Law scholars
claim that VARA was poorly drafted and offers too little-or too
much-protection to visual artists. 48 Any hopes that artists may have
Rights: Diagnosis and Rehabilitation, 46 AM. Bus. L. J. 407 (2009) (discussing various economic
and political interests behind American ambivalence to joining Berne).
43.
See Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 101, Title VI,
104 Stat. 5128 (1990).
44.
See id.
45.
Id. § 106A(d)(1). Under French law moral rights are perpetual and inalienable. See
C. PROP. INTELL., art. 1.121-1 (Fr.).

46.
See Roberta Kwall, How FineArt Fares Post VARA, 1 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1,
4 (1997) (describing the slovenly drafting and sketchy politicking associated with this
legislation); Monica Pa & Christopher Robinson, Making Lemons Out of Lemons: Recent
Deuelopments in the Visual Artists Rights Act, LANDSLIDE , Jan.-Feb. 2009, at 22 (asserting that
the judiciary's application of VARA betrays: (1) the reluctance with which this legislation was
enacted, and (2) the limited protection it ostensibly offers to a narrow range of artistic endeavor).
47.
See Pa & Robinson, supra note 46, at 22.
48.
See Amy Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 263, 287, 295, 297 (2009):
Moral rights law therefore rests on a vision of art at odds with contemporary art
practice. The law obstructs rather than enables the creation of art ... I would argue
that the incoherence of the category of "art" has become the subject of contemporary
art. The lack of distinction between art and other objects is now a central
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harbored that VARA would enable their professional and financial
improvement have turned to ashes in their mouths with the growing
49
number of VARA cases decided against the artists who filed them.
Even more, because federal law preempts state statutes providing
attribution and integrity rights, artists may discover that the rights in
these areas that they enjoyed under state law are actually scanter
because of VARA. 0
VARA provides artists with lifetime rights of integrity and
attribution in original works of visual art created after 1990, the year
of VARA's enactment. 1 The artist may waive these rights, but not
transfer them to another.5 2 VARA also extends these rights to works
created prior to 1990 unless-or until-an artist has transferred his

preoccupation in contemporary art. Moral rights law depends on and glorifies a line
between art and everyday objects that no longer exists.
Id. (emphasis added); Thomas Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L.
REV. 1 (1997) (asserting that waivable moral rights in the U.S. provide little benefit to artists
and society at large, and that non-waivable moral rights-in countries like France and
Germany-actually inhibit the production of works of art); Roberta Kwall, Originality in Context,
44 Hous. L. REV. 871 (2007) (asserting that while functional works should be excluded from
moral rights, artistic works in genres other than visual art also should be protected under moral
rights law as long as they demonstrate sufficient originality as determined by judicial
evaluation); Robert J. Sherman, Note, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: American Artists
Burned Again, 17 CARDOzO L. REV. 373, 416-17 (1995).
49.
See Cotter, supra note 48, at 26 ('The suggestion that the statutes have had little
effect is consistent with some of the findings disclosed in a recent Copyright Office Report on the
Waiver of Moral Rights in Visual Artworks."). Moreover, in 2008, muralist Kent Twitchell settled
for $1.1 million his moral rights claim arising over the obscuration of his Ed Ruscha mural in Los
Angeles. The mural, which covered six stories and one side of a building, was painted over.
Defendants included the U.S. Government and the Job Corps Center of the YWCA, the building's
owners and tenants, respectively. Prior to settlement the Central District of California dismissed
the dispute on grounds of sovereign immunity, and dismissed the moral rights claim under
VARA against the U.S. The plaintiff sought to pursue the matter based not only on his VARA
claims against non-U.S. parties but, alternatively, on California moral rights law under the
California Artist Protection Act. See Pa & Robinson, supra note 46, at 27; William Brutocao &
Eric Bjorgum, VARA and CAPA- Lessons from the Twitchell Case, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Sept.
2008, at 18. While the plaintiff, and others, hailed news of the apparently generous settlement as
a vindication of artists' moral rights under VARA, the case provides no judicial precedent on this
matter. Given the tortured factual ambiguities of the case-in particular on the essential
question of who owned title to the mural when and the thicket of government and private
parties, and federal and state law involved, it appears likely the defendants may have
determined the most economical and expedient resolution of the matter would be to settle on this
plaintiff with a litigious history an amount that might permit him to restore his mural. See id.
50.
See NIMMER, supra note 25, at § 8D.06.
51.
VARA applies to works created six months or more after the date the bill was
enacted. VARA, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 610, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990); see also NIMMER, supra note
25, at § 8D.06.
52.
See VARA, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 610, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990).
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title to the physical work."
Most VARA decisions, however, have
turned on the courts' dissection of the works themselves, a method of
analysis that has typically led courts to conclude that the work in
dispute is ineligible for VARA protection.
Courts have homed in on the ambiguities and limited scope of
VARA and have consistently denied artists' claims of moral rights
violations. In several VARA disputes, courts have decided against the
artist on temporal grounds, or upon a finding that the art in question
54
was "made for hire," and therefore outside VARA's scope.
Additionally, in some instances, courts, perhaps unintentionally, have
even disparaged the works in question, thereby threatening further
distress to the reputations and amour-propreof aggrieved artists.
In Lilley v. Stout, a district court held that the prints and
negatives of photographs that the plaintiff, a professional
photographer, took, which the defendant ultimately incorporated into
a larger work, were ineligible for VARA protection.55 Despite the fact
that the plaintiff took the photographs in order to create a work of
visual art, the court denied them protection under VARA because it
did not believe that they were taken "for exhibition purposes only," as
the statute requires.5 6 The court found that the photographs were
merely "studies" that might be used for a number of unrelated
purposes. 5 71 Courts have likewise deemed a political poster, house
plans, and a design of an athletic trophy to be works outside VARA's

53.
17 U.S.C. § 106A (d) (2006). Because moral rights under VARA attach only to the
material fixation(s) of an artist's expression, this extension of moral rights to works created
before 1990 is not very meaningful given the artist/owner's legal dominion over the work through
property and copyright law. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
54.
See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d. 77 (2d Cir. 1995) (artists' creation was a
work made for hire and therefore outside the scope of VARA protection); Hunter v. Squirrel Hill
Assocs., 413 F. Supp. 2d 517 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (plaintiffs VARA complaint could not be entertained
because it was brought outside the statute of limitations); Pavia v. 1120 Ave. of the Americas,
901 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (VARA claim barred because both the creation of the work and
the allegedly illegal conduct concerning it occurred prior to VARA's enactment). In Carter,
VARA did not protect the sprawling and eclectic sculptural work involved because the court
determined that the artists had legal status as the employees of one of the defendants during the
creation of the work. See 71 F.3d at 87-88. Many, if not most, artists who work on commissioned
pieces are not legally the employees of the commissioning party, and the commissioned pieces
would not be considered works made for hire under VARA. See Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA)
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 101, Title VI, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990).
55.
384 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D.D.C. 2005).
56.
Id. at 87.
57.
Id. at 88.
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protection, as well as "site-specific" art works that were integrated
58
within particular geographical locations.
Furthermore, VARA requires that a work be "of recognized
stature" before its creator is granted the right to prevent its
destruction.5 9 Courts have rigorously interpreted this requirement,
thereby undoubtedly bruising artists' egos in determining, for
instance, that Joanne Pollara's Gideon Coalition mural, and Linda
Scott's Swan sculpture, were not works "of recognized stature" worthy
60
of protection under VARA.

II.

VISUAL ART IN THE TWENTIETH AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURIES: THE
61
SHOCK OF THE NEW
Not this modern stuff I hope
represent a soul in torment.
- Robert Hughes

you know, 'Portrait of a Lampshade Upside Down' to

62

To gain perspective on the challenges facing those charged with
developing what the Kelley court called the "taxonomy" of VARAprotected works-i.e., what constitutes a "work of visual art" under
the statute-it may be useful briefly to consider the m6lange of genres
of modern and contemporary art that implicates moral rights today.
The following discussion first considers the broad and lingering
58.
See Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F. 3d 128 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding
untenable the notion that VARA could both apply to site-specific art and simultaneously also
allow its destruction by permitting its removal under the "public presentation" exception); Nat'l
Ass'n For Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Scharle, 184 Fed. Appx. 270 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding
trophy designs were merely drafts of works, not single or limited quantity pieces contemplated
by VARA); Landrau v. Solis Betancourt, 554 F. Supp. 2d 102, 111 (D.P.R. 2007) (finding
Landrau's architectural plans for a house were merely "technical drawings" and therefore
ineligible for VARA protection); Pollara v. Seymour, 206 F. Supp. 2d 333 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (state
did not violate artist's VARA rights in summarily removing and rending her political mural that
was deemed as having no lasting value).
59.
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (2006).
60.
Scott v. Dixon, 309 F. Supp. 2d. 395 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Pollara v. Seymour, 206 F.
Supp. 2d 333 (N.D.N.Y. 2002). Ultimately, of course, judges determine whether a work is "of
recognized stature." This statutory category of works is difficult to square with the reality that
most works of art that are unquestionably "of recognized stature" did not achieve this status
until many years if not decades after their creation. On judicial unease about the courts' role in
aesthetic determinations see infra note 141 and accompanying text.
61.
ROBERT HUGHES, THE SHOCK OF THE NEW: THE HUNDRED YEAR HISTORY OF MODERN
ITS RISE, ITS DAZZLING ACHIEVEMENT, ITS FALL (Rev. ed. 1991).

ART

62.
"Not this modern stuff I hope you know, 'Portrait of a Lampshade Upside Down' to
represent a soul in torment." See REBECCA (Selznick International Pictures 1940) (remark by the
genial and bumbling brother-in-law of the work's protagonist-a line appearing in the screenplay
of Alfred Hitchcock's movie, but not in Daphne du Maurier's underlying novel).
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influence of Impressionist painting on twentieth-century movements
in the visual arts. It then focuses on characteristics shared among
works of certain twentieth and twenty-first century genres of visual
art and suggests how these traits represent a departure from previous
genres not only in how works of art are created, but also in how they
are perceived in the eyes of the public and in the eyes of the law. This
departure signals a rejection of the traditional genres of visual art
that copyright law and moral rights law under VARA were designed to
protect. A logical consequence of this rejection is the loss-or
abandonment-of these legal protections for art and artists.
Paintings by, and in the style of, Impressionist artists are
among the most popular today. Sale prices for works of van Gogh
have broken records. 63 Museum galleries and exhibitions devoted to
works of Renoir, Cezanne, and Pissarro are among the most reliable
draws for visitors. Reproductions and imitations of works by Monet
and Sisley are predictable fixtures on the walls of the professionally
decorated houses of the haute bourgeoisie of a certain age. It is indeed
curious therefore, that this genre of painting has become one of the
most commercialized and accessible given its origins in the Salon des
Refusgs in Paris in 1863 and the implications of marginalization and
64
penury appurtenant to the venue.
The Acad6mie des Beaux-Art's Salon de Paris rejected the
works of Impressionists like Manet and instead promoted the creation
6
It
and sale of more traditional highly representational portraits.
also promoted paintings of historical and religious scenes by artists
like Ingr~s and Delacroix, who at that time were considered among
the finest exponents of French painting. 66 Today, we consider
Impressionist pictures, portraying hazy quotidian and open-air scenes
63.
In 1990, the Japanese entrepreneur Ryoei Saito bought van Gogh's Portraitof Dr.
Gachet for $82.5 million and Renoir's At the Moulin de /a Galette for $78.1 million. Headliners,
Art Appreciator, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1990, at D5. Dr. Gachet has had a particularly parlous
provenance given Ryoei Saito's threat to have the painting cremated along with his body, in
order to avoid death taxes associated with it. See Nicole B. Wilkes, Public Responsibilities of
Private Owners of Cultural Property: Toward a National Art Preservation Statute, 24 COLUM.VLA J.L. & ARTS 177 (2001) at 186.

64.
See Ross KING, THE JUDGMENT OF PARIS: THE REVOLUTIONARY DECADE THAT GAVE
THE WORLD IMPRESSIONISM (2006).
65.
Id. at 8.
66.
The origins of the Salon des Refuses were more complicated than suggested by the
conservative/avant- garde dispute of lore, owing much to the attempts of the Beaux-Arts
administrations to improve the quality of works submitted for exhibition by requiring artists to
provide a limited number of finished works. See Albert Boime, An Unpublished Petition
Exemplifying the Oneness of the Community of Nineteenth-Century French Artists, 33 J.
WARBURG & COURTAULD INSTITUTES 345 (1970).
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using bright dabs of color, more "painterly" than their conservative
counterparts, like those of G6ricault, despite the opprobrium visited
upon them by the art establishment in mid-nineteenth century
Paris. 67
To the extent that Impressionist works are less
representational than are paintings associated with previous schools,
they reflect modern-day notions of Romantic authorship. 68 Ideally,
according to the Romantic perspective, creators should be privileged to
work unfettered by financial concerns, mainstream tastes, and art
consumers' predilections, in order to make works expressing to the
69
greatest extent possible the personal genius of the artist.
Since the advent of Impressionism in the latter half of the
nineteenth century, artists have continued to develop new genres and
sub-genres, including Expressionism, Cubism, Fauvism, Surrealism,
and Postmodernism.7 0 Like the Impressionists, artists associated with
these twentieth century movements eschewed representation and
created images that viewers were less immediately-if at all-able to
71
identify than the recognizable images of representational artists.

67.
See Ross King, supra note 64. Art historians refer to "painterly" works as those in
which the brushwork and paint qualities are visible and emphasized. See CONCISE OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF ART TERMS (2001).
68.
See Jaszi, supra note 32, at 462. Romantic authorship implies a hierarchy of artistic
production, in which art contains greater value if it results from "true imagination rather than
mere application." See id.
69.
In the popular imagination today, creators of visual works of art are particularly
exempt from standards of conventional behavior - consider the archly fatuous "Bad Boy"
appellation sedulously nurtured by merchandisers like Damien Hirst. See Roberta Smith,
"Swagger and Sideburns; Bad Boys in Galleries," NY TIMES, Feb. 12, 2010 at C25. Indeed,
mental disorders, alcoholism, and other addictions are perceived as validations of the creative
personalities of artists like van Gogh and Jackson Pollock, and works created under the
influence of these regrettable influences are often as-if not more valuable than works that
were not. One of the Getty Museum's most prized works is van Gogh's Irises, which was painted
while the artist was living in an asylum in St. Rmy during the last year of his life. See ALBERT
LUBIN, STRANGER ON THE EARTH; A PSYCHOLOGICAL BIOGRAPHY OF VINCENT VAN GOGH (1996)
186. This has not been the case for serious musicians. Consider, for instance, Rossini, Donizetti,
and Schumann-all three musicians suffered periods of dreadful mental disorder, and to the
extent they were able to compose any music during these times of distress, these works are
generally considered inferior to those works written in times of sanity. See generally, ASHBROOK,
ET AL., THE NEW GROVE MASTERS OF ITALIAN OPERA: ROSSINI, DONIZETTI, BELLINI, VERDI,
PUCCINI (1980).
70.
See generally Hughes, supra note 61.
71.
The late art historian E.H. Gombrich claimed that a great work of representational
art tends to appear more real and compelling because the artist deliberately avoids creating a
facsimile of an existing image or scene but rather creates one in which dimensions, colors, etc.,
are slightly askew. See EDWARD DOLNICK, THE FORGER'S SPELL 136 (Harper Collins 2008). The
appeal of these works lies in the fact that humans respond positively to attempts to replicate an
image or object, but only up to a point. According to the theory of the "Uncanny Valley," our
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The origins and objectives of the genres of twentieth century, nonrepresentational art responded in varying degrees to political,
aesthetic, and economic forces. 72 The non-representational nature of
paintings of many of these categories, however, attests also to the
broad consensus among active creators and consumers of visual arttethered to Impressionist roots-that the interests of artists take
priority over the interests of the consumers who commission,
73
purchase, and view their work.
The museum visitor looking at Impressionist paintings today
sees depictions of dancers, flowers, scenes of the out-of-doors, and
many other aspects of ordinary life. These images are rendered in
articulated daubs or strokes of paint that are quite perceptible as such
even when viewed at some distance from the painting. Nineteenthcentury viewers who first saw these works by Degas, Monet, and
others perceived the same images of dancers and flowers as readily as
we do today. 74 The painterly renderings of these images may have
been more novel or distracting to these initial viewers than they are to
museum visitors today, but the basic ability to perceive the artist's
intentions and the objects depicted in these works has not changed
over time.
Paintings of the Cubist and Surrealist movements from the
first half of the twentieth century are more challenging to the casual
museum visitor seeking appealing and original depictions of
recognizable objects, individuals, events, and locales. Coming across
Cubist works by Picasso and Braque, for instance, the casual visitor's
eye will likely dart to the surrounding wall, searching for textual
information that may confirm his hunch that he is looking at a
depiction of a guitar, or a bowl of fruit. Moving forward, this visitor
will find the abstract Expressionist works of Mark Rothko and
Jackson Pollock from the middle of the twentieth century to be even
more opaque, depicting little or nothing that is identifiable beyond the
works themselves.
Finally, arriving at rooms filled with works of late twentieth
century and present-day artists, the visitor will suddenly return to
readily identifiable images in the Appropriationist and Conceptual
positive response to attempts to capture reality in images plummets when the replication is very
close, but not exact. See id.
72.
See Hughes, supra note 61.
73.
See GARDNER, supra note 21.

74.

See OTTO FRIEDRICH, OLYMPIA: PARIS IN THE AGE OF MANET (HarperCollins 1992).

L'Oeuvre, 1 mile Zola's ronan o clef from 1886, evokes the reception by Paris fine art circles of
Manet's once-notorious Le dejeuner sur l'herbe, first shown at the Salon des Refuses in 1863.
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works of Andy Warhol, Robert Gober, Jeff Koons, and Damien Hirst. 75
The wall tags of these works need no descriptive information, as the
giant images and sculptures of consumer products, pop singers, and
slaughtered and balloon animals are instantly recognizable. There is
often little virtuosity in the execution of these works-they are meant
to be flagrantly depictive of commonplace images, and their effect
depends upon the viewer's recognition of these images. One of the
artists' objectives is to prompt the viewer to consider why the museum
privileges these works by displaying them in the first place. The
viewer, in turn, will likely wonder why he might gaze thoughtfully
upon literal reproductions of images encountered elsewhere that he
otherwise may find insipid, distasteful, or simply inconsequential.
One might have to step beyond the walls of the museum to
experience many works of Conceptual art created over the past fifty
years.7 6 Conceptual art, as the term implies, is a loosely defined genre
of works in which the artist's underlying concept or idea is more
important to the ultimate meaning and worth ascribed to the work
77
than is a particular material rendering of it.
To view Robert
75.
The collages of Picasso, Georges Braque, Juan Gris, and others in the early
twentieth century are colorably Appropriationist works in that they combine portions of preexisting finished images. They differ, however, from works by contemporary Appropriationist
artists like Jeff Koons in that the materials they use are "found" rather than "appropriated."
While one can readily identify the bits of newspaper, caning, string, etc. worked into these
collages, viewers are mainly struck by their artful deployment within a larger work whose
meaning is greater than the sum of its parts. he meaning of Appropriationist works by Jeff
Koons, Andy Warhol, et al.-soup tins, cereal boxes, and balloon toys-is bound to the fact that
the works themselves are no more than the sum of their parts, albeit tricked out by their deified
presentation within the hallowed precincts of art galleries and museums.
76.
Conceptual artists may use media in which senses other than sight may play a
significant role in our perception of a particular work. Even art works in traditional media may
appeal to senses other than sight.
77.
See Holland Cotter, The Collected Ingredients of a Beijing Life, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
2009, at C1 ("[Zhao Xiangyuan] is often referred to as a Conceptualist, meaning an artist who
trades as much in ideas as in materials. And it was he who had the idea of turning the contents
of his mother's home, which was also his childhood home, into the installation titled 'Waste
Not."').
Many widely known recent musical and choreographic works share the conceptual
impulse found in certain Postmodern works of visual art. John Cage's "aleatoric" music and the
late Pina Bausch's difficult-to-categorize Tanztheater choreographies are akin to Andy Warhol's
renditions of soup tins in that much of their meaning and appeal we trace to the works'
underlying ideas and sources rather than to a particular realization of them. See, e.g., JOHN
CAGE, MUSIC OF CHANGES (1951) (an indeterminate work in which the music is created anew
according to divination principles set out in the I Ching); Pina Bausch, Nelken [Carnations]
(2005) (in which thousands of freshly cut pink carnations are trampled over a two-hour
performance of surrealist and unrelated anecdotes).
Computer-generated and computer-assisted compositions particularly musical
works-tend also toward the conceptual because our experience of them is strongly influenced by
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Smithson's original Spiral Jetty, for instance, one must visit Utah's
Great Salt Lake, the location of the man-made formation of rock and
earth. 78 To have experienced Anna Schuleit's Bloom-comprised of
recorded sound and twenty-eight thousand flowers placed inside a
psychiatric hospital-one would have had to have visited the
Massachusetts Mental Health Center during a period of four days in
79
November of 2003.
Conceptual works of Installation art depend largely upon forces
that are extrinsic or quasi-extrinsic to the works themselves. 80 When
these forces are natural, like climate, vegetation, and geography, the
artist cedes at least some degree of control over the ultimate work.
Robert Smithson's Spiral Jetty would lose its appeal entirely were the
remarkable pink-hued water of the Great Salt Lake in which it lies to
turn bilious.8 1 Likewise, Jeff Koons's Puppy would lose all of its
essential campy charm-indeed its raison d'etre-and would become
merely, and unintentionally, grotesque if the leaves and flowers
comprising it wilted and died. 2
Jeff Koons's gigantic floral dog is, of course, a Conceptual work,
an arch reference to irredeemably kitschy works like chia-coated
pottery (of which it is flagrantly derivative), ice and butter sculptures,
and renderings of objects in macaroni, seashells, toothpicks, and the
non-musical attributes, especially the knowledge that a mechanical force is participating in the
production of the music itself, and not merely the performance of the work we ultimately hear.
See Charles Cronin, Virtual Music Scores, Copyright and the Promotion of a Marginalized
Technology, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 16-20 (2004) (discussing copyright protection for
indeterminate and computer- generated musical works); Arthur Miller, Copyright Protection for
Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since
CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977, 1072 (1993).
78.
See DIA Art Foundation, Robert Smithson: Spiral Jetty, http://www.spiraljetty.org/
(last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
79.
See
State
Hospitals
of
Massachusetts,
Anna
Schuleit,
Bloom,
http://www.1856.org/anna/bloom.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
80.
On this point one need only think of the installations of Christo Javacheff and their
dependence on natural and man-made works like the Cliffs of Dover or Central Park.
81.
The DIA Art Foundation, which now owns Spiral Jetty, is aware of this work's
dependence upon its natural surroundings. This can be seen in DIA's recently voiced concerns
about a fertilizer company's plans to increase the number of solar evaporation ponds on the
Great
Salt Lake.
See DIA
Art Foundation,
Robert
Smithson:
Spiral Jetty,
http://www.spiraljetty.org/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). In 2008, DIA objected to a Canadian oil
company's application for permission to conduct exploratory drilling in the Great Salt Lake,
fearful of potential change in the appearance of the Lake, and thereby, of Spiral Jetty. DIA Art
Foundation, Robert Smithson: Spiral Jetty, Preservation, http://www.diaart.org/sites/page/59/
1245 (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
82.
Puppy was first installed in 1992 in Bad Arolsen (Germany) and has been recreated
since in several locations including Sydney, New York, and Bilbao (Spain). See Wikipedia, Jeff
Koons, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeff Koons (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
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like. 83 As such, the primary locus of meaning and appeal in this work
lies in the artist's use of particular compositional materials-in this
case, living flowers that are universally appealing.8 4 Koons's work
brings us back to Chapman Kelley's Wildflower Works-his "living
5
piece of art"-and matters of copyrightability.8
Each one of the many genres comprising the taxonomy of visual
art over the past century has distinctive attributes distinguishing
works of that genre from those of another. While the resultant
diversity of media this has implicated has fostered some disagreement
among audiences on the basic question "what is art?," one finds that
works in these various new genres share certain commonalities on
matters pertinent to copyright-fixation, originality, and sufficiency of
expression, in particular.

III. COPYRIGHT, MORAL RIGHTS, AND LIVING WORKS OF VISUAL ART
A. Living Plants as an Artistic Medium
Chapman Kelley's Wildflower Works is one example of a
growing number of works by Conceptual artists whose medium is not
paint and canvas but rather plants and the soil in which they are
rooted. Practitioners of this horticultural artistic method include, in
addition to Chapman Kelley, the American sculptor Meg Webster, the
late Brazilian architect Burle Marx, and the French artist Patrick
Blanc, best known for his murs vdgdtaux (plant walls) in which he
aggressively claims copyright. 86 Sharon Louden, another American
83.
Mocking references to such works are common in popular entertainment to signal
the bumpkinly nature of certain characters, while simultaneously offering subtle reassurance to
those partaking of such mainstream entertainments of their superior cultural sophistication. See
LE DINER DE CONS (Gaumont 1998) (the story's "con" [idiot] creates toothpick models of
monuments like the Eiffel Tower); Seinfeld: The Understudy (NBC television broadcast May 18,
1995) (character Cosmo Kramer builds figurines of living persons using variously shaped
uncooked macaroni); STEEL MAGNOLIAS (Tri-Star 1989) (outdoor Nativity scene in rural
Louisiana town rendered in sparklers).
84.
See Ken Johnson, Well-Behaved Street-Corner Sculpture, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2009,
at C19 (commenting on recently installed public sculptures in New York that include giant
"Hello Kitty" dolls: "Outdoor art isn't what it used to be. Once it honored heroic individuals and
upheld values that whole populations could embrace. Today . . .outdoor art serves rather to
divert, amuse and comfort.").
85.
In promoting Kelley's Wildflower Works the Chicago Park District used the
expression "living piece of art." See Isaacs, supra note 9, at Bi.
86. See Patrick Blanc, Vertical Garden, http://www.verticalgardenpatrickblanc.com/
mainen.php (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). "The Vegetal Wall is protected in particular by
copyright. Any reproduction, representation or exploitation of the Vegetal Wall that is not
strictly private and no [sic] commercial or promotional will require the preliminary and written
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artist, also used vegetation as a significant component of one of her
works, Reflecting Tips, which blends reflective metal wire with wild
87

grasses.

Unlike Jeff Koons, who used flowers in an ironic manner by
exploiting their sentimentality and immediate appeal, horticultural
artists like Chapman Kelley and Patrick Blanc use flowering plants
for more painterly purposes-in particular, for their colors and
textures. 8 8 Red carnations, might, therefore, serve for these artists
the same purpose that a patch of oil paint of the same color would
serve a traditional painter. The obvious difference between these two
media is the fact that the carnation is not merely a shade of red; it is
also an easily identified living object and, as such, carries a great deal
more meaning standing alone than does an inert red paint chip. 89 It is
precisely because plants and flowers are universally recognizable
objects that horticultural artists use them only in abstract, nonrepresentational works. 90 To use them otherwise would result in
works of questionable taste, conjuring images of shrubbery clipped in
the shape of corporate names and logos, and ranks of marching bands,
authorization of Patrick Blanc." Id. The French seem particularly inclined to extend the concept
of authorship beyond traditional media- to man-made fragrances, for instance. See, e.g., E ditions
de Parfums Fr6d6ric Malle, www.editionsdeparfums.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (promoting
fragrances created by particular perfumers as a publishing house would promote books by
writers they publish).
87.
See Sharon Lounden Home Page, http://www.sharonlouden.com (last visited Nov. 15,
2009). Like Chapman Kelley's Wildflower Works, Reflecting Tips was the subject of a VARA
dispute when Louden claimed that the commissioning party, the Yahoo! Corporation, violated
her moral rights when it trimmed the vegetal "tips" of her eponymous work in response to the
City of Mountain View's complaints about unkempt premises at Yahoo!'s corporate headquarters.
Sharon Louden v. Yahoo! Inc., No. C07-05053 (N.C. Cal. filed Oct. 1, 2007). The dispute settled
prior to trial and Reflecting Tips was restored sufficiently to mollify the plaintiff. See e-mail
message from Sharon Louden to Charles Cronin (May 7, 2009, 20:02 EST) (on file with author).
88.
While the murs udgetaux of Patrick Blanc, for instance, tend to be constituted mainly
of green-leaved plants like philodendrons and ferns, the interplay of the very different textures of
these plants make the works visually interesting. See Patrick Blanc, Vertical Garden,
http://www.verticalgardenpatrickblanc.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
89.

See generally PAUL FUSSELL, CLASS: A GUIDE THROUGH THE AMERICAN CLASS

SYSTEM (Summit Books 1983). Fussell's mordantly brilliant taxonomy of taste and class in
America deals at length with the influences of camp and archaism in cultural life and social
status in the U.S. It includes an analysis of flowers:
Other prole flowers include anything too vividly red, like red tulips. Declassed also
are phlox, zinnias, salvia, gladioli, begonias, dahlias, fuchsias, and petunias.
Members of the middle class will sometimes hope to mitigate the vulgarity of brightred flowers by planting them in a rotting wheelbarrow or rowboat displayed on the
front lawn, but seldom with success.
Id. at 80.
90.

See generally MICHAEL JUUL HOLM ET AL.,

Museum of Modern Art 2004).

THE FLOWER AS IMAGE (Louisiana
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or corps of water ballerinas, deployed to depict recognizable symbols
or objects. 9 1
B. Living Works and the Question of Fixation
Fixed works of human intellection are arguably more socially
valuable than are those that are unfixed because, to a far greater
extent than ephemeral creations, a greater number of individuals can
access them, in numerous locations, and for an indefinite period of
time. 92 Some argue, however, that society should award an author a
temporary monopoly-a copyright-even in his fixed works of original
expression only if the author provides society with a tangible record of
the expression. 93 Like the many means of delineating borders of real
property, this fixed record serves both authors and readers of works by
establishing the scope of an author's exclusive rights in what is
94
ultimately an intangible asset.

Fixation-which is not a prerequisite for protection under
certain civil law copyright regimes like that of France-was not
expressly required under U.S. law until the current Copyright Act
took effect in 1978. 95 Fixation was implicitly required, however, under
the prior U.S. copyright statute. 96 Under that system, only works of
authorship that had been published or registered, - neither of which
97
is possible without fixation, were eligible for protection.

91.
Sophisticated gardeners and artists never deploy plants in their works unless done
with ironic intent-to depict images of recognizable objects, lest they conjure associations with
theme parks and similar cultural catastrophes in which there is a reasonable chance that one
may encounter a word, or an image of an object or animal, rendered in marigolds or zinnias.
Topiary is less aesthetically dicey, in part because of its archaic associations with the dilapidated
country houses of erstwhile British aristocrats and landed gentry, and the fussy parterres of
French seventeenth-century gardens.
92.
Thus, had Shakespeare not fixed his works, we would not be able to enjoy them
today, hundreds of years later, and thousands of miles from place they were written.
93.
See Stefan Hubanov, The Multifaceted Nature and Problematic Status of Fixation in
U.S. Copyright Law, 11 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 111, 113-15 (2006).

94.
See id.
95.
Article 2(1) of the Berne Convention leaves it to member countries to determine
whether fixation in some material form is required for copyright protection. See generally,
GRAHAM DUTFIELD & UMA SUTHERSANEN, GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 3-42 (2008)

(referring to the copyrighted laser light display at the Eiffel Tower, and noting how difficulties
could arise when country A does not require fixation while country B does, and a country A nonfixed work is at stake).
96.
Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
97.
See Hubanov, supra note 93. See also NIMMER, supra note 25, at § 2.03 (noting that
fixation is not merely a statutory condition to copyright but also a constitutional necessity;
unless a work is reduced to tangible form it cannot be regarded as a "writing").
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Fixation has been a less complex and less disputed copyright
requirement than that of original expression because, until fairly
recently, most works of authorship were unambiguously fixed in
tangible artifacts like printed books, journals, music scores, and sheet
music. 98 With the advent of digital technologies and the ephemeral
and transient nature of copyrightable expression, fixation has become
a more troublesome matter than it used to be. 99 Additionally, new
media, used in rendering works in genres of contemporary art, have
challenged us to examine our understanding of what constitutes
fixation, and to ask whether and why it should remain a prerequisite
for copyright protection.100
The 1976 Act's definition of fixation embraces works in many
media, even those that have not yet been developed.1 0 1 The definition
is similarly expansive regarding how long a work must be perceptible
in a static material form to be considered fixed, requiring only that the
period must be "of more than transitory duration." 10 2 All man-made
material objects embodying works of intellectual expression decay, or
are rendered obsolete, at varying rates over time. A sculpture
rendered in Cor-Ten steel will retain its structural integrity longer
than one built of sand, but the steel structure will ultimately succumb
to natural corrosives and the laws of physics and will eventually turn
into sand itself. The color and texture of materials like paint and
stone change over time in response to external forces like atmosphere
and light. These changes occur gradually, almost imperceptibly, and
these works' custodians, whose goal is to thwart these mutations and
to preserve or restore the works as they existed at the time they were
created, view with regret this deterioration, known as "inherent
vice. '' 103 Fixation, then, is a matter of degree, and, ultimately, an issue
98.
Since the 1960s, the U.S. Copyright Office has accepted sound recordings as fixations
of musical works. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 87TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: REPORT
OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 136

(1961). Query whether the Copyright Office's relaxation of its earlier requirement that musical
works be registered in symbolic form was not merely a practical adjustment to technological
developments but also an unwitting reflection upon the state of musical literacy in the United
States.
99.
See Hubanov, supra note 93.
100.
See NIMMER, supra note 25, at § 2.03 (2009) (noting the problem of fixation for
Conceptual art works, referring to "anti-object" artist Le Ann Wilchusky's 1977 work consisting
of crepe-paper streamers thrown from an airplane).
101.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
102.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
103.
"Some objects are made of unstable materials that change irreversibly over time.
This phenomenon is often referred to as 'inherent vice."' Yale University Art Gallery's Exhibition
Time Will Tell: Ethics and Choices in Conservation (May 22 Sept. 6, 2009).
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that courts must decide in copyright disputes involving works of
ambiguous stability. 104

While artists like Chapman Kelley assert that plants serve the
same purpose for them as oils do for traditional painters, plants are
profoundly different than inorganic paint, chalk, crayon, and other
traditional media. 105 As every gardener and farmer is ruefully aware,
plant cultivation is an undertaking characterized, for good and for ill,
by uncertainty and change.1 06 Plants, like animate organisms, go
through a life cycle and ultimately die, reflecting in their odor, flavor,
and appearance the particular qualities of extrinsic elements of their
milieu like water, air, and soil.107
The volatility of plants was the most seductive-and ultimately
the most nettlesome-aspect of this living medium that artists
Chapman Kelley and Sharon Louden used in Wildflower Works and
Reflecting Tips, respectively. 0 8 Both works were initially popular, in
large measure because of the wonder that their changing and colorful
landscapes elicited. 0 9 Over the course of several years, however, with
the natural evolution of their constituent materials causing the
atrophying of foliage and diminished efflorescence, these same
collections of plants came to be considered blights." 0

104.
See NIMMER, supra note 25, at § 2.03[A][2] (discussing cases applying the fixation
analysis to live television broadcasts).
105.
See Barbara Sullivan, Gone to Seed: How One Artist's Dream of a Wildflower Garden
Turned into a Blooming Nightmare, CHI. TRIB., July 6, 1989 ('It's not a garden. It's a painting.").
106.
Essential for the production of the finest flowers, fruits, and vegetables is the
grower's toleration of uncertainty, and acceptance of some risk in letting nature take its course.
This is one reason why we pay premium prices for flowers and produce that have been exposed to
natural elements rather than under the artificial conditions of agribusiness-i.e., forced with
electric light to grow out of season; sheltered from wind, precipitation, and chill air to prevent
visual imperfections; over-watered and regularly doused with petroleum-based fertilizers,
pesticides, and fungicides to produce uniformly large, coarse, flowers and large, but typically
insipid, fruits and vegetables.
107.
It is well known that the hue of the common hydrangea blossom, for instance,
correlates directly to the acidity of the soil surrounding the plant's roots; acidulous soil produces
blue flowers while alkaline soil produces pink ones (rather like litmus paper). See KATHLEEN
BRENZEL, SUNSET WESTERN GARDEN BOOK 401 (8th ed. 2007). Similarly, the flavors of grapes
used for winemaking are intimately linked to the terroir in which they are grown."). See ED
MCCARTHY, MARYANNE EGAN, TONY ASPLER, WINE FOR DUMMIES (2009) at 125 ('[terroir] is the
whole package of natural, interactive forces that affect the grapevine and its fruit.").
108.
See supra notes 9, 84 and accompanying text.
109.
See Kelly Crow, "It's Yahoo's Lawn, But This Artists Says Keep Off the Grass," WALL
ST. J., Oct. 1, 2007, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/article-print/
SB119101266764543043.html; Sullivan, supra note 104, at 105.
110.
See id.
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Reactions by the public and municipal authorities to this
inevitable diminishment in the once-appealing appearances"' of these
works instigated the events that provoked their respective VARA
disputes. This relatively swift diminishment in turn raises questions
about U.S. copyright law's fixation prerequisite where works of art in
which living materials are the principal medium are concerned.
Moreover, even if we were to assume that a visual or textual record,
like a photograph or narrative description, of a living work is a
fixation of it, who is the author of such a work? Should a work whose
meaning and value we attribute mainly to naturally occurring
phenomena be considered copyrightable expression, and, if so, what is
the appropriate scope of that protection, and to whom should it be
provided?
In Kelley, the Chicago Park District claimed that Wildflower
Works, as a living work, was ineligible for copyright because it was
insufficiently fixed." 2 The district court alluded to this fixation
argument in its discussion of copyrightable expression but found it
unnecessary to pass judgment on the matter because it determined
that Wildflower Works was not copyrightable on independent grounds
3
of insufficient originality."1
The district court did, however, obliquely consider the question
of fixation in rationalizing its determination that Wildflower Works
was a painting4 and a sculpture under the Copyright Act's definition of
"visual art."" Countering the defendant's argument that Wildflower
Works was not a work of art because it was comprised of living plants,
the court identified other recognized works of art in which continual
changes in appearance are essential to the value and effect of the
works.1 ' The dynamic aspect of an Alexander Calder mobile, the
court noted, does not lessen its standing as a fixed work of art.
Likewise, the court noted that the fact that Jeff Koons used topiary for
his Puppy does not preclude it from consideration as a work of visual
6
art, in this case a sculpture."
On the issue of fixation, the court's comparison of Wildflower
Works to Calder's mobiles and Koons's plant sculpture is not entirely
apt. While Calder's mobiles depend upon dynamic external elements,
111.
Id.
112.
Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., No. 04 C 07715, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75791, at *16
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2008)..
113.
See id. at *17.
114.
See id. at *12-13.
115.
Id.
116.
Id.
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such as air currents, the dependence is relatively slight compared to
the virtually total reliance of Wildflower Works on natural elements
that are mostly beyond the artist's control. A Calder mobile placed in
a dark storeroom ultimately loses none of its economic or artistic
worth. This is because Alexander Calder, to a much greater extent
than naturally occurring wind currents, is responsible for the
aesthetic expression in these works. The material object in which
Calder fixed this expression, even in an inert state, retains the same
aesthetic potential it had prior to being stored.
Jeff Koons's Puppy is a sculpture built of plants, but it is not,
strictly speaking, topiary, as the court claims.1 17 Objecting to the
court's use of this term may appear caviling, but it leads to a larger
observation on fixation and expression. Topiary refers to the shaping
of living trees and shrubs through pruning, pollarding, trimming, and
11 8
training, into recognizable images and ornamental shapes.
Like sculptures in stone and wood, topiary involves the
transformation of a naturally occurring object into a work expressing
the aesthetic intentions of its creator. In Puppy, however, the artist
has made no attempt to transform naturally occurring flowering
plants to express something unrelated to the medium. Koons simply
inserted living plants into a metal mesh frame shaped like a puppy.
Thousands of gardeners do the same thing every spring when they
plant the frames of hanging flower baskets and other similar
horticultural ornamental frames.
It is only by physically transforming naturally occurring
materials into man-made objects that artists create something
recognizably their own, and simultaneously fix their original
expression. In the case of topiary, this original expression tends to be
relatively slight given that this sculptural media, whose primary tool
is hedge clippers, particularly emphasizes "sweat of the brow"-not to
mention that of other parts of the body-over cerebration. Without
this transformation of the living shrubbery the impact of naturally
occurring materials predominates over that of the artist's work, as
does the ephemeral, rather than the fixed, nature of the work in
question. In the case of Puppy, Koon's virtual complete reliance upon
plants in their naturally occurring state perforce lessens his authorial
responsibility for the work.

117.
Id. at *13.
118.
See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (defining topiary as "[c]onsisting in
clipping and trimming shrubs, etc. into ornamental or fantastic shapes.").
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With respect to fixation, Kelley's Wildflower Works, like similar
living works of Sharon Louden, Anna Schuleit, and Patrick Blanc, is
more similar to Puppy than to a Calder mobile. Wildflower Works
capitalizes upon the colors, textures, and scents of natural plants that
change from week to week-even day to day-at certain times of the
year. This volatility lends his work an appealing delicacy and
ephemerality. Kelley could have used artificial plants and flowers to
create an unambiguously fixed work. The repugnance of such an idea,
however, underscores the vital importance of unfixed natural forces in
his work.11 9

C. Living Art Works and OriginalExpression-"TheMedium is the
Message"1 20
Many of the works from the past fifty years or so that are
considered serious noteworthy visual art are Conceptual works. The
aesthetic effect of these pieces rests more on the abstract intentions of
the artist rather than upon an actual finished artifact revealing the
technique and skill associated with a particular practitioner. 12 1 This
is true of both non-representational works and Appropriationist works
whose effect depends not on simulacrums but rather on literal copies
122
of commonplace images and objects.
Despite the typically ironic artistic elevation of commonplace
images and objects, novelty, in terms of underlying concept or conceit,
has overtaken discernable personal style as the locus of principal
worth in many works of contemporary art. 23 Related to this
119.
Had Kelley used artificial flowers, however, Wildflower Works would take on a
significantly ironic cast, not only because of the jarring juxtaposition of this medium with the
word "wild" in the title of the work, but also given the distaste such simulacra evoke within the
artistic and culturally attuned worlds in which Kelley operates. See Fussell, supra note 89.
"[F]lowers usually appear in upper [class] living rooms. (Fresh flowers, the middle-class
housewife will call them to distinguish them from the plastic ones assumed in her world.)" Id. at
88.
120.
This phrase was first coined by Marshall McLuhan in 1964. See MARSHALL
MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 7-21 (MIT Press 1994).
121.
See Denis Dutton, Has Conceptual Art Jumped the Shark Tank?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
16, 2009, at A27 (claiming that Conceptual art is a dubious undertaking because it shuns
technique and virtuosity). Paradoxically, while the underlying ideas are more valued than the
finished artifacts of Conceptual art, the physical materials used in the renderings of Conceptual
works are often more vital to the particular significance ascribed to these works than they are to
more traditional works in oils, watercolors, gouache, etc. See id.
122.
For a brief discussion of the term "appropriationist," see supra note 75.
123.
Jackson Pollock's drip paintings are famous and of significant economic value in
large measure because of our awareness of the artist's unorthodox physical method of creating
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development is a heightened emphasis upon the particular media in
which contemporary works are rendered and an increased significance
of the larger contexts in which these works of art are displayed or
experienced.
As noted above, artists' use over the last century of unexpected
materials like string or bits of fur within works of traditional genres
like painting can be traced to artistic currents in the nineteenth
century. 124 The colored blots of Impressionist paintings, while curious
and even grotesque when closely examined, are transformed when
viewed at a distance into a whole whose greater meaning overtakes
our knowledge of its constituent articulated parts. Unlike the quasimosaic technique found in certain Impressionist works, however, the
use of non-traditional compositional materials in more recent
12
paintings is often a ploy to lure the viewer closer to the work.
Artists generally use this technique to satisfy the viewer's often
morbid or prurient curiosity as to how and where outr6 materials have
26
been incorporated into a work identified as a painting or sculpture.1
The use of unconventional materials often contributes to the
conceptual flavor of these works. This is particularly true when the
materials themselves are provocative or disgusting, like condoms,
pornographic images, excrement, and urine. The calculated frisson
that an artist's use of such materials imposes tends to overwhelm any
other purported message or meaning embodied in the images and
127
objects built of these materials.
these works that involved a sort of emotive dancing about while holding a dripping paintbrush.
The ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, on the other hand, is famous-and of incalculable value-only
in small part because we are aware of the physical contortions Michelangelo endured in creating
this work.
124.
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.

125.

See e.g.,

CAROLEE SCHNEEMANN,

IMAGING HER EROTICS: ESSAYS, INTERVIEWS,

PROJECTS 149 (MIT Press 2003) (Scheemann's Blood Work Diary (1972), menstrual blotting on
tissue, egg yolk, silver paper).
126.
Id.
127.
This "Where's Waldo?" aspect to the viewing of some works of contemporary art is
fostered by the standard practice of listing media on labels accompanying works of art. Artists
are, obviously, aware of this practice, which plays a role in their decisions to use media that
might generate publicity and notoriety and, thereby, profits. See Dan Barry and Carol Vogel,
Giuliani Vows to Cut Subsidy Over 'Sick'Art, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1999, at Al.
The purpose of exhibition of works including a bust of a man made from blood and a
portrait of the Virgin Mary stained with elephant dung may have been to inflate the
value of the collection owned by advertiser Charles Saatchi... The Brooklyn Museum
sought to create ...

excitement for the show ...

it announced that children under 17

would have to be accompanied by an adult.
Id.; see also Roberta Smith, Art in Reiew, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1997, at C24 (noting artist Meg
Webster's predilection for using dirt, egg white, and thick slabs of butter as media for her works).
An exhibit at New York's Museum of Sex features an Adriana Bertini couture condom cocktail
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Works of Conceptual art, whether large-scale Installation
works or more modestly proportioned works in more conventional
media, rely upon extrinsic circumstances like location, weather, and
lighting to a much greater extent than do works in traditional
genres.1 28 It is axiomatic that the meaning of a work of Installation
art-generally speaking a sub-genre of Conceptual art-depends
largely on the location and other contextual circumstances of the
work. The meanings of works of Conceptual art in more conventional
media too, however, rely upon extrinsic circumstances to a much
greater extent than do earlier works in traditional genres. Most
people recognize a Monet painting, regardless of where they see it, as
a work by this artist-even if it is stripped of the sumptuous frame
and the rarified surroundings typically associated with Monet's
works.
The same individuals would see the works of Marcel
Duchamp, Joseph Kosuth, and Jeff Koons, on the other hand, as
urinals, unremarkable chairs, and balloon figures, with little or no
aesthetic appeal, were they to come across them outside a museum or
similar context. 129
Thus, works of Conceptual art are less resilient than more
traditional works, because they are more closely associated with a
particular time and place that largely determines their more fragile
import.130 Paradoxically, the ascendancy of Conceptual art, with its
dress, made from 1200 hand-dyed condoms and fashioned after the Valentino dresses of the
1960s. See Edward Rothstein, "Unrolled, Unbridled and Unabashed," N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2010,
at C25. Andres Serrano's "Piss Christ" became notorious simply because its creator used urine in
making the piece. See Frank Rich, "Pull the Plug on Brooklyn," N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1999, at A17
(discussing controversial works using excrement and urine).
128.
See infra Part III.E.
129.
Marcel Duchamp, Fountain (1917) available at http://www.duchamp.org/symposium/
images/fountain.jpg; Jeff Koons, Celebration(1995-98), available at http://artnews.org/
gallery.php?i=618&g cai= 36863&Jeff/620Koons (one piece in larger series); Joseph Kosuth, One
and Three Chairs (1965), available at http://www.moma.org/modernteachers/large
image.php?id=207. Some would claim that certain works of Conceptual art owe even their
concept to someone other than the putative artist. See Peter E. Rosenblatt, Letter to the Editor,
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2008, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
990DE1DD1230F937A35756COA96E9C8B63.
Why is 'Balloon Dog,' the large construction currently atop the Metropolitan Museum
roof, said to be by Jeff Koons? Mr. Koons did not conceive the original balloon figure of
a dog, nor did he create the gigantic finished piece, made by Carlson & Company. Mr.
Koons simply found something to duplicate and suggested making it big and shiny.
Id.
130.
They are also more vulnerable to destruction because most people do not regard
Conceptual works, and even non-representational works in general, with the same reverence
they accord even second-rate representational paintings. Unintentionally comical illustrations of
this vulnerability include janitors' discarding rubbish comprising works by Damien Hirst and
Gustav Metzger at London galleries, and scrubbing a filthy bathtub that was part of a work by
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inherent ephemerality and external dependencies, occurred within the
same era in which legal protection for art was expanded under VARA,
which ostensibly ensures the preservation of unambiguously fixed
131
original works of art for the edification of future generations.
In Kelley, Judge Coar based his decision that Wildflower Works
was not eligible for VARA protection on finding that this work was not
copyrightable in the first place.' 3 2 As set forth in the Copyright Act,
works that are not copyrightable cannot qualify as works of visual art
that VARA protects. 33 Furthermore, although graphical works that
are fixed and original may be copyrightable, VARA protects only the
small portion of these copyrighted works that manage further to
comport with the narrow statutory definition of "works of visual
134
art."
Judge Coar believed that Wildflower Works was a work of
visual art-a painting or sculpture, as the plaintiff claimed-but
determined that the work did not contain sufficient original
artist Joseph Beuys. See Lawrence Van Gelder, Arts Briefing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2004, at E2;
see also David Itzkoff, Missing Moore Sculpture May Have Been Sold for Scrap, N.Y. TIMES
(ARTSBEAT), May 19, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/pages/arts/index.html (reporting
that, in 2005, an abstract bronze sculpture by Henry Moore worth several million dollars was
stolen and sold for $2,300 as scrap metal).
131.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text. Conceptual art works may tend towards
the ephemeral, but this genre itself is now well established in the mainstream of contemporary
art. The first page of the July 3, 2009, Weekend Arts section of the New York Times, for instance,
offered reviews of three exhibitions, all dealing with works of Conceptual art. Roberta Smith's
"Bouncing Around a Visual Echo Chamber" reports on a Dan Graham retrospective at the
Whitney Museum that included his Schema-"[A] marvel of contextual self-reference. Intended
to be printed in different magazines, it would be different each time, since it consists of a list of
information about itself: its own typeface, the magazine's paper stock and page size." Roberta
Smith, Bouncing Around a Visual Echo Chamber, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/03/arts/design/03graham.html. Holland Cotter covered Rachel
Harrison's Consider the Lobster at Bard College, prefacing his discussion of the work of "a stage
set, and a tacky one," with the proviso: "Ms. Harrison ... is often called a sculptor ... but she is
also, and simultaneously, a painter, photographer, video maker, collagist, and installation
artist." Holland Cotter, The Museum as Stage Set, Filled With GlamorousMess, N.Y. TIMES, July
3, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/03/arts/design/03harrison.html. Carol
Vogel reviewed Serpentine Gallery's (London) Jeff Koons: Popeye Series. Carol Vogel, Koons and
a Sailor Man in London, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/
03/arts/design/03vogel.html?_r=l. Given Jeff Koons's prior bruising scrapes with copyright
owners, one wonders whether he obtained licenses for his literal reproductions of images of the
famous cartoon character and inflatable toys that comprise this exhibition. See also JOHN
MERRYMAN & ALBERT ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 452 (4th ed., 2002) ('Jeff
Koons is a seasoned defendant in copyright infringement suits, and the decisions involving him,
each citing the previous one, have been merciless.").
132.
Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., No. 04 C 07715, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75791, at *18
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2008).
133.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
134.
Id. § 101.
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expression to be copyrightable. 35 In denying VARA protection to
Chapman Kelley's Wildflower Works, Judge Coar gingerly approached
the question of whether VARA should cover works in non-traditional
media when he alluded to the "tension between the law and the
evolution of ideas in modern or avant garde art."136 Indeed, VARA's
legislative history indicates Congress's intent that courts use common
sense in considering whether a particular work falls within VARA's
scope and not base their determinations solely upon the particular
medium in which a work of art is rendered.1 37 This hortation for
liberality, however, is checked by the fact that VARA's drafters also
went to "extreme lengths to very narrowly define the works of art that
will be covered ....
38

[T]his legislation covers only a very select group

1
of artists."
Given that one of the two arguably orthogonal objectives of
VARA is to preserve a record of artistic achievement for future
generations, it is reasonable to assume that Congress intended
copyrightability to be merely a threshold requirement for VARA
protection. 139 Using common sense, one can assume that the fact that
a work of visual expression may be copyrightable does not mean it
qualifies for VARA's more rarified category of work of visual art.
Inclusion in this "very select" group logically demands a greater

135.
The court separates the question of Wildflower Work's copyrightability from whether
it is a "work of visual art." The statutory definition of "work of visual art," however, indicates
that a determination of the latter depends upon a positive finding on the former. In other words,
hewing to a literal reading of the statute, a painting or sculpture is not a "work of visual art"
under VARA unless it is also a copyrightable work. Kelley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75791, at *1017.
136.
Id. at *11.
137. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-514 (1990).
The courts should use common sense and generally accepted standards of the artistic
community in determining whether a particular work falls within the scope of the
definition. Artists may work in a variety of media, and use any number of materials in
creating their works. Therefore, whether a particular work falls within the definition
should not depend on the medium or materials used.
Id.
138.
See id. (quoting testimony of Rep. Edward Markey).
139.
See Roberta Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the
Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 2002 (2002) (arguing that the fact that artists'
motivations to create are typically more intrinsic than economic indicates that moral rights
should apply only to works demonstrating substantial creativity, and not merely the "modicum of
creativity" for copyright protection under Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Svc. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
345 (1991)).
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showing of creative expression than the mere "creative spark" that
140
copyright requires.
Ultimately, the courts must determine whether disputed works
are fixed and demonstrate sufficient original expressionto qualify for
copyright protection and also for moral rights protection as works of
visual art. 14'
In Kelley, the court arrived at the singular
determination that Wildflower Works contained sufficient originality
to be called a sculpture or a painting "within the definition of VARA,"
yet VARA did not protect it because this work was not sufficiently
original to be copyrightable. 42 Surely, under the common sense
standard that VARA's proponents recommended, if a work does not
evince sufficient original expression to be copyrightable, the work
should belong in a category other than "visual art" as this term is
contemplated under VARA. This conclusion leads to the related
question of what level of original expression should be required of
works that are copyrightable in order to be considered "visual art
works" eligible for VARA protection.
More particularly, it is
questionable whether living works of art can ever evince original
expression that would garner VARA protection or even copyright
protection.

140.
See Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Svc. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (establishing
this standard for copyrightability that exceeds a lower threshold of mere industrious application
or "sweat of the brow" on the part of the creator).
141.
The fact that courts determine such questions troubled Justice Holmes, who
expressed his reservations in this well-known excerpt:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations ... some works of genius
would be sure to miss appreciation ... It may be ... doubted ... whether paintings of
Manet would have been sure of protection when seen for the first time.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). Holmes was concerned that
while judges might be insufficiently educated in visual art to discern the aesthetic value of a
work by Manet they might also be too sophisticated to appreciate artistic merit in the realistic
images of advertisements. See id. Holmes's conclusion that commercial illustrations may be
copyrightable expression seems correct-although they could never qualify as works of visual art
under VARA but his suggestion that, upon first encountering their works, courts might have
denied protection under modern standards of copyrightability to non-commercial paintings and
drawings of artists like Manet and Goya, does not. Some contemporaries of these artists may
have found their works disturbing or even pornographic, but no one doubted that they contained
a significant quantity of perceptible personal expression that was immediately apparent to all
viewers even if not entirely understood or appreciated.
142.
See Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., No. 04 C 07715, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75791, at
*17 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2008).
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D. The Elusive Definition and Quantificationof Creative Expression
As with fixation, there are degrees to which works of
authorship are original and expressive. At one end of the spectrum of
creativity are works barely clearing the "creative spark" threshold; at
the opposite end are canonical works of music, literature, and the fine
arts. 143 While there is some general agreement as to the minimal
quantum of original expression required for copyright as set forth in
Feist, there is rather less consensus as to what amount of creativity
must be demonstrated for something to be considered a work of art.
The late art historian Ernst Gombrich defined art in the
broadest terms, as anything done superbly well. 144 This catholic
definition could include the living results of expert cosmetic surgery, a
deftly executed serve in a tennis game, or even the performance of an
unfortunate animal in a circus act. Such a freewheeling view of art
would embrace innumerable useful and ephemeral works that fall far
outside the ambit of copyright protection. This broad definition is not,
therefore, ultimately helpful in answering the narrower question of
what should be considered a work of visual art that is worthy of moral
rights protection under VARA.
One of VARA's objectives is to ensure a tangible and enduring
record of original human expression in the visual arts. 14
This
objective, and the Copyright Act's persnickety definition of visual art
that expressly excludes, among other works, those of a commercial
and promotional ilk, indicates that VARA's legislators had in mind a
146
narrower definition of art than that proposed by Ernst Gombrich.
Thus, a more plausible reading of "visual art" as used in VARA is
based on a belief that one of VARA's core purposes is to protect
tangible works of visual art that record significant human creativity,

143.
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 340 (noting that works must show some "creative spark" on the
part of their authors to be protected by copyright).
144.
ERNST GOMBRICK, THE STORY OF ART 475 (12th ed., 1972 ("[W]e speak of art
whenever anything is done so superlatively well that we all but forget to ask what the work is
supposed to be, for sheer admiration of the way it is done.").
145.
See Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title VI, 104
Stat. 5128 (1990).
146.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). "A work of visual art does not include any poster, map, globe,
chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art . . . electronic publication, or similar
publication . . . any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering, or
packaging material or container." Id.
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i.e., "the process by which a symbolic domain in the culture is
47
changed."1
Only within the past several hundred years have paintings,
sculptures, and other visual works of art come to be considered works
of intellectual expression like music and poetry. In Leonardo da
Vinci's time, painting was viewed as "vulgar to its very roots.' 48 In
the opinion of Leonardo's contemporary, the classical scholar Mario
Equicola, it was "a work and a labor of the body rather than of the
149
mind, and [was], more often than not, exercised by the ignorant."'
The same perspective still existed over a hundred years later in
connection with Dutch painting and artists now reverentially referred
to as "Old Masters": "[I]n Holland, Vermeer and his peers were
'generally ignored or completely forgotten.' Painters were tradesmen
who worked with their hands. Poets, who worked with words rather
than pestles and powders, were the figures held in esteem."'5 0 Unlike
Renaissance painters and sculptors, poets and musicians of that era as
well as those of previous and subsequent eras, used symbolic systems
of language and music, allowing them to create works more purely "of
5
intellect."' '
By calling painters "ignorant," Equicola alludes to the fact that
only those educated in the symbols of words and notes can create and
147. MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: FLOW AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DISCOVERY
AND INVENTION 7-8 (1996).
[Creativity] does not deal with great ideas for clinching business deals, new ways for
baking stuffed artichokes, or original ways of decorating the living room for a party.
These are examples of creativity with a small c, which is an important ingredient of
everyday life, one that we definitely should try to enhance. But to do so well it is
necessary first to understand Creativity.
Id.
148.
See GARDNER, supra note 21, at 1 (quoting Mario Equicola). It was during the Italian
Renaissance, however, that painters, sculptors and architects began to achieve broad recognition
as creators of works of great intellectual expression. In the sixteenth century Georgio Vasari
chronicled this development among Italian artists, in his seminal treatise. See LE VITE DE' PI
ECCELLENTI PITTORI, SCULTORI E ARCHITETTORI [THE LIVES OF THE ARTISTS] (1550).
149.
See GARDNER, supra note 21, at 1 (quoting Mario Eqicola).

150.
DOLNICK, supra note 71, at 95. In other words, painters and sculptors work with
material objects, whereas writers and musicians work primarily with symbols and ideas. Given
the long-standing view that works of visual art are more the products of skilled physical labor
than of purely intellectual endeavor, the Conceptual art movement-in which visual artists have
waded into political and social criticism associated more with the work of those of more cerebral
m6tiers-is anomalous. See id.
151.
The development of the symbolic systems of literature and music has enabled
writers and musicians to create and record their expression with great precision. The fin de si~cle
scores of orchestral works by Mahler and Schoenberg, for instance, present not only fundamental
musical information-i.e., pitches over time-but also, in excruciating detail, information on how
performers should interpret this information.
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read important works of literature and music. A long history of
successful self-taught painters and sculptors indicates that the ability
to create fine works of visual and tactile art does not necessarily
demand the same formal, and typically early, education in the
formation and combination of the symbols of language and music
prerequisite to becoming a serious writer or musician. 152
The symbols of music and language-in many respects like
those of physics and other hard sciences-hold great expressive
potential and freedom to those capable of using them.5 3 A skilled
writer or musician isolated with nothing more than rudimentary
materials in which to record his expression need-indeed, ultimately
must-resort to his intellect alone to create an original work. 154 His
mastery of a symbolic language affords him immediate and universal
access to tools of the trade that, being non-material, allow him
virtually complete control over them, limited only by the scope of his
knowledge and imagination.
Because the musician and writer's work is expressed in their
medium's symbolic language, it can be readily and accurately
replicated; as a result, their work is less vulnerable to the corruption
and disintegration that haunt works of visual art, and musical works
conceived and fixed only as sound. If the musician or writer creates
an extraordinarily expressive work using symbols, it will ultimately
152.
One of the best known examples of a late-blooming visual artist is Anna Mary
Robertson ('Grandma Moses") who began painting seriously when she was in her seventies, and
without any formal education in the arts. Her paintings and embroideries of rural New England
scenes swiftly became enormously popular and valuable in the U.S. and abroad. See OTTO
KALLIR, GRANDMA MOSES (1973). Although they may exist, any similar success stories involving
septuagenarian symphonists, novelists, or poets who had similarly scant formal education in the
respective fields of music, literature, etc are not readily known.
153.
See CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, supra note 147, at 37.
Knowledge mediated by symbols is extrasomatic . . . it must be intentionally passed
on and learned . . . . [K]nowledge conveyed by symbols is bundled up in discrete
domains- geometry, music... each domain describes an isolated little world in which

a person can think and act with clarity and concentration .
domains is perhaps the best evidence of human creativity.

. .

. The existence of

Id.
154.
Not surprisingly, apocryphal stories about playful incarceration and material
deprivation to force the production of creative work, have arisen in connection with Mozart, the
most preternaturally gifted composer. See Visit Salzburg, Fun Facts, http://www.visitsalzburg.net/funfacts.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2009) (advertising the charms of the
Zauberfldtenhfiuschen ('Magic Flute Cottage") in which Emanuel Schikaneder purportedly
imprisoned Mozart until the composer finished the score for Die Zauberfldte); City of Prague,
Villa Bertramka, www.prague.cz/bertramka/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2009) (promoting Prague's
Villa Bertramka, where Josefa Duskova, a professional singer and chatelaine of this villa in the
late eighteenth century, is reported to have locked Mozart in a little garden pavilion until he
completed a new aria that would flatter her voice, called Bella mia fiamma, addio).
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transcend time, space, and materiality more freely than non-symbolic
works fixed in media like paint or stone because it is not bound to a
particular rendering or performance. 5 5

While visual artists do not use symbolic languages as do
writers, mathematicians, and musicians, they can resort to many
media, ranging from elemental chalk and paint to highly

manufactured materials like plastics and moving images, to create
their works.1 16 The more elemental and inert the medium an artist
uses, however, the more the significance of the work will depend upon
the artist's technique. Likewise, the more elemental the medium, the
greater the potential that the work rendered in it will be recognized as
the expression of the unique personality of the particular artist. The
purpose of copyright is to protect and encourage such revelatory
expression. 1 7 It is not, therefore, too extravagant a corollary that

works created from elemental media are more likely to enjoy more
robust copyright protection than are those created using media-e.g.,
digital image or sound creation software-that depend largely on
preexisting expression of others.

Since time immemorial, artists have used materials like wet
plaster, stone, clay, tempera, and oil because of their durability. It is
perhaps because of the expertise demanded to work effectively with
155.
Bach's Goldberg Variations (1741) is magnificent whether performed on a
harpsichord or a marimba; Rilke's poetry is exquisite even in translation; the charm of a great
novel like Austen's EMMA can withstand radical updating and even a change of media. See
CLUELESS (Paramount Pictures 1995). "Updated" iconic works of visual art-like gay and lesbian
versions of Grant Wood's American Gothic (1930), or cut-outs of Michelangelo's David with clipon bits of exiguous underwear, or Duchamp's mustachioed Mona Lisa-are inevitably humorous
or grotesque precisely because the underlying works themselves are closely bound to the era and
media in which they were created, and the updating glosses appear therefore, outrageous or
incongruous.
156.
While the visual arts do not have symbolic languages like those of music or
literature, visual artists may use motifs, forms, and colors that carry symbolic or iconographic
significance. To understand these uses viewers must have a certain degree of "visual literacy."
Florigoraphy-the language of flowers-and similarly arcane means of communication, is not so
much a symbolic system as it is a semaphore. This is because flowers are remarkably
polysemous. Roses are red and violets are blue, but these flowers also appear in a myriad of
other colors, represent love and humility respectively, and are claimed as "state flower" by no
fewer than seven states. See 50 States, Official Flowers, www.50states.com/flower.htm (last
visited Nov. 16, 2009).
157.
See JOHN WHICHER, THE CREATIVE ARTS AND THE JUDICIAL
VARIATIONS ON A LEGAL THEME (1965).

PROCESS: FOUR

When we read Frost's poetry, we feel, somehow, that we have met the poet. But when
we see a stylish coiffure on a lady's head, we may admire the lady, but we certainly do
not feel that we have met her hairdresser. Art is, we may generally conclude, in some
sense revelatory . . . of an artist's personality . . . but a tradesman's skill is not

similarly revelatory of the personality of the tradesman.
Id. at 79-80.
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these materials that works rendered in wet plaster, stone, and the like
tend to last longer than works created in more ephemeral media.
Such works are also among those that we have traditionally prized
most as records of our cultural legacy. 1 8 Because these materials hold
little aesthetic interest apart from their application by artists, they
are unobtrusive in a finished work, allowing the artist's expression to
capture viewers' attention practically to the point that those viewing
the work are unaware of the medium.
The media used in works like collages and mosaics tend to
intrude on the viewer's consciousness to a greater extent than the
more static media of drawings, oils, watercolors, and the like. In
Picasso's relief constructions, for instance, the bits of string, fringe,
and the like incorporated into these works jump out at the viewer.
This is true even when these media are literal representations of these
objects within the image. 1 9 This is because those viewing these works
realize that these media "have a life of their own" apart from the
painting, to a greater extent than do the oils or charcoals used in
traditional paintings and drawings.
Recognition of "found objects"-like a piece of string-in a work
of art may generate appreciation of the artist's cleverness in adapting
an object to such use. However, it also dilutes, to varying degrees, the
viewer's sense of the artist's exclusive authorship in the work. The
more a medium conveys meaning beyond its pure utility as a means of
expressing an author's intentions, the greater the portion of the
meaning and authorship of a work the artist cedes to preexisting
materials created by others or nature. Accordingly, by using vacuum
cleaners as a primary media for his work, Jeff Koons cedes to the
Hoover Company most of the creativity involved in his New Hoover
Convertibles.
The mostly inert bits of wire, fringe, and caning that Picasso
inserted into his works do not significantly affect the general
perception that Picasso is solely responsible for the aesthetic meaning
of these works. However, the use of less static "found objects," like
urinals, and the use of these media to occupy a considerable portion of
the work's literal and figurative space raise legitimate doubts about
the authorial responsibility of the putative artist. Such use also calls
into question the validity or scope of any claim the artist might assert

158.
Since cave-painting eras, such works are also among those that societies have
traditionally prized most as records of their cultural legacy.
159.
See Pablo Picasso, Still Life (1914) (Tate Collection, London).

2010]

LIVING AND CONCEPTUAL ART AND VARA

in original expression associated with the work.160 This is particularly
true in the case of Appropriationist works that are comprised almost
entirely of preexisting recorded expression by others. 16'
Marcel
Duchamp's graffito from 1916, L.H.O.O.Q., on an image of the Mona
Lisa depends entirely on Leonardo's iconic expression, just as the
effect of the burning of a flag or an effigy relies upon a wellestablished
meaning
associated with the
flag or effigy.
Appropriationist works like these, whose meaning tilts heavily
towards the preexisting expression of another, are Conceptual works.
The contribution of the Appropriationist artist is merely a notion or
idea, rather than original expression.
One can easily tease apart the preexisting from the newly
added expression in Appropriationist works like Duchamp's
L.H.O.O.Q. or the myriad of parodies of Grant Wood's American
Gothic, which was created in 1930. The preexisting work continues to
exist in its permanently fixed state, in which form one can readily
compare it to the derivative work. In fact, the import of these later
derivations depends entirely upon widespread awareness of the
preexisting work in its original state.
E. Authorship and Expression in Living Works of Art
It is more difficult to apportion authorship in works rendered
in living-or once living, or even animate-media than it is to
separate the new from the old expression in Appropriationist works
that comprise extant inert documents like paintings and drawings.
Living media like plants and flowers change constantly.
This
volatility captivates artists and viewers, but it makes elusive the

160.
See Marcel Duchamp, Fountain (1917) (the original urinal is lost).
161.
Legitimate doubts about authorial responsibility arise with respect to
Appropriationist works in other areas of creative endeavor as well. Lee Siegel nicely sums up
these doubts in his reflection on the briefly famous Appropriationist GREY ALBUM, the mash-up
recording in which Brian Burton (aka "Danger Mouse") superimposed a rap recording onto a
Beatles song. "Most mash-ups are sheepish imitations disguised as bold new creations or attacks.
(Danger Mouse indeed). They put you in mind of Christopher Lasch's definition of the clinical
narcissist ....
As someone 'whose sense of self depends on the validation of others whom he
nevertheless degrades"'. AGAINST THE MACHINE 142 (2008). Works like GREY ALBUM are not part

of the long tradition in which composers have created original works based upon a recognizable
melody of a previous work by another musician. Even if Paganini's 24 T' CAPRICE (1819) were
protected by copyright, composers of the innumerable sets of variations on its theme-by
Brahms, Rachmaninoff, and Lutoslawski, among many others would have a colorable argument
of fair use of Paganini's melody because of their transformative uses of the pre-existing
expression. In these works Paganini's pre-existing work is, literally, reduced to merely thematic
material-i.e. a concept or genre, like a Nativity scene, or a Classical myth, in the visual arts.
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fixation of works created in these media and in turn obscures the
apportionment between the artist and the media in the meaning and
appeal of a particular work.
Looking at one of Patrick Blanc's copyrighted living walls
(murs vdgdtaux), one is likely to be at least dimly aware of Blanc's skill
in combining plants of varied textures and colors into a visually
pleasing whole. 16 2
Because Blanc's walls do not depict any
recognizable image, the unusual medium, i.e., living plants, of these
works is primarily responsible for their meaning and appeal. 16 3 In
these works, then, nature, to a far greater extent than the human
artist, is the source of the delectation a viewer may take in the color or
fragrance of a bloom, or the texture and shape of the leaves, or the
knowledge that the appearance of the living wall will change along
with the seasons.
The work of an artist who uses living materials for his
creations is more akin to that of a conductor or director than to that of
a composer or dramatist.1 64 Like the conductor or director, the
artist/gardener may carefully choose and nurture the individual
contributing members, i.e., plants, in the case of the artist/landscape
architect. The ultimate effect of the production, however, hinges
mainly upon the conduct of the individual members. Viewers may
intuit this dependency when they attend an opera or concert, just as
they do when they see a lovely garden. The realization of the
possibility that there may be an ill or disaffected tenor or horn player
lurking among the musicians makes a successful performance all the
more savory to opera-goers. Likewise, the knowledge that plants are
susceptible to any number of malevolent and parasitical forces
underscores our appreciation of the work of an artist/gardener who
has successfully coaxed a variety of individual plants into coexisting
within an aesthetically pleasing whole.
The same inherent volatility of works of art created from living
media distinguishes them from architectural works. Buildings, like
all man-made creations, change and deteriorate over time from
exposure to natural elements and man-made corrosives like air

162.
See Kristin Hohenadel, All His Rooms are Living Rooms, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2007
("[Blanc] has been careful to copyright his walls, like works of art.").
163.
For the same reason, photographs of these murs adgetaux capture very little of the
allure of the physical garden walls themselves. See id. (providing photographs of several of
Patrick Blanc's works).
164.
Musical and dramatic performances are not protected by copyright unless they are
fixed in recordings: "A work is created when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2006).
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pollution. Additionally, buildings, unlike gardens, tend to reflect the
express intentions of their architects, regardless of where they are
located.165
While the climate, topography, and geography of the
location of a particular building heavily influence an architect's work,
these forces do not dictate the parameters of the building to the same
extent that they do those of the works of a landscape architect or an
artist working with living plants. New York's Guggenheim Museum
would be immediately recognizable as the work of Frank Lloyd Wright
even if it were placed in Riyadh or Helsinki; Chapman Kelley's
Wildflower Works would swiftly vaporize into unrecognizable
desiccated and tangled dross if it were moved to either location. 166
However, in the legal context, the line is often blurred between
works of architecture and landscape architecture. Among the items in
Article 2 of the Berne Convention's rambling list of literary and
artistic works are "three-dimensional works relative to geography,
topography, architecture or science." 16 7 This language suggests that
works of landscape architecture could be considered copyrightable
expression.
Berne's expansive ethos of copyrightable expression
notwithstanding, the U.S. Congress prescribed more limiting language
for the protection of architectural works in the United States, not only
avoiding reference to works relating to geography and topography, but
also limiting protection of architectural works to those rendered in
buildings.16 8 This deliberate narrowing of the language of Berne

165.
Some golfers claim that certain golf courses clearly indicate the hand of a particular
designer. See Charles McGrath, Author, Author: Did Tillinghast Really Design Bethpage Black?,
N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2009, at D1 (comparing the dispute over who designed the Bethpage Golf
Course in Long Island to the debate between the Stratfordians and the Oxfordians on the
authorship of Shakespeare's works).
166.
Over time, even situated in the relatively more temperate climate of Chicago,
Wildflower Works was susceptible to natural forces and the lifecycles of its constituent plants
that led to its demise. See Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., No. 04 C 07715, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
75791, at *8-9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2008).
167.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne
Convention), Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised, Paris, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, art. (2)(1) (Paris
text).
168.
In 1990 Congress enacted the Architectural Copyright Protection Act (ACPA) that
added architectural works to the list of works expressly eligible for copyright. Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 701, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990). Like VARA, which
was enacted simultaneously through the same bill, the scope of the ACPA is limited to the
architectural designs of buildings. See id. Congress enacted both acts in the wake of the United
State's joining in 1989 the Berne Convention. See NIMMER, supra note 25, at § 2.20 (noting that
domestic copyright laws of Berne member states have never been uniform on the matter of
copyright protection afforded architectural plans); see also Todd Hixon, Note, The Architectural
Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990: At Odds With the TraditionalLimitations of American
Copyright Law, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 629, 653 (1995).
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implies Congress's potential unease in flirting with the possibility of
an unintentional extension of copyright protection beyond buildings to
volatile works like landscapes in which natural media challenge our
notions of fixation and human expression. 169
IV. COPYRIGHT AND MORAL RIGHTS UNDER VARA APPLIED TO
CONCEPTUAL AND LIVING WORKS OF ART

A. Conceptual/LivingArt: Authenticity, Value, Originals,and Copies
The economic potential of copyright as it applies to many works
of intellectual expression is self-evident. Copyright owners of popular
novels, songs, and movies benefit financially from their exclusive
rights to copy and distribute these works. The economic benefit of
copyright to authors is more ambiguous however, in connection with
works of fine art-and works of Conceptual art in particular-in
which monetary value tends to attach mainly to original artifacts
rather than copies.
Critic Walter Benjamin famously asserted that the "mechanical
reproduction" of an art object would tarnish the "aura" of the original
work. 170 Art critic James Gardner claims that, having lived for more
than a century with the results of "mechanical reproduction,"
'
Benjamin's thesis is "palpably wrong."1 71
Indeed, the near universal
availability of mechanically produced images of works by Old Masters,
With respect to the application of copyright law to architectural works, a "building"
according to the U.S. Copyright Office refers to "structures that are habitable by humans and
intended to be both permanent and stationary, such as houses and office buildings and other
permanent and stationary structures designed for human occupancy, including, but not limited
to, churches, museums, gazebos, and garden pavilions." U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 41,
COPYRIGHT CLAIMS IN ARCHITECTURAL WORKS (2009).
169.
Prior to the enactment of ACPA, U.S. law provided no copyright protection for
buildings unless they were essentially pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works lacking the utility of
most buildings (habitation, education, worship, etc.). Expanding the scope of copyright protection
to designs fixed in useful buildings introduces a "can of worms ...[and] a whole new concept into
the copyright law," claimed Paul Goldstein in his testimony before Congress on this legislation.
See Hixon, supra note 168, at 634. Hixon suggests that Congress should have followed the
American Institute of Architects' suggestion that the Copyright Act be amended to provide the
copyright holder of architectural drawings the exclusive right to execute those plans. See id. at
654. This would not offer protection to the building per se, and others would be free to derive
'measured drawings" from their permissible observation of the building's exterior and erect
buildings that appear similar, much as engineers and scientists may legitimately "reverseengineer" the work of another to create a similar product that competes in the marketplace with
the former. See id.
170.
See WALTER BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in
ILLUMINATIONS 217 (Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn trans., 1968) (1955).
171.
See GARDNER, supra note 21, at 34.
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among others, may have diminished the aesthetic impact of these
works, but it has only enhanced the iconic status of these works and
their commensurate economic worth. 172
The reproduction and distribution of images of nonrepresentational works of art and Conceptual works is arguably even
more useful for enhancing the value of, and markets for, the original
objects of these works than for those of works of earlier eras. 173 The
meaning and appeal of these works are less immediately accessible
than they are of representational works, and successful efforts to
implant images of these works on as many minds as possible enhance
their value. 174 For many of these works, however, the reproductions
themselves are arguably less valuable than are the reproductions of
pre-Modern works. Photographs, and even video recordings, of Anna
Schuleit's Bloom merely hint at the complexity one would have
experienced through sight, smell, and touch during the work's brief
run in the sensitive location of a psychiatric hospital. The same is
true, for instance, of Christo Javacheffs Gates, the Central Park
installation whose effect depended largely on visitors being physically
present to appreciate this peculiar intrusion of hundreds of pieces of
orange fabric on the bleak landscape of Central Park mid-winter.175
Reproductions of Appropriationist art works are similarly less
valuable than those of representational works, but the relationship
between the reproduction and the original object for these works is
more complex. Photographs of works like Andy Warhol's Campbell's
Soup Cans and Jackson Pollock's drip paintings carry less of the
aesthetic impact of the original objects than do, say, photographs of
Old Master paintings. This is because the effect of these more recent
works, like the installation art of Anna Schuleit and Christo
Javacheff, depend upon extrinsic environmental influences to a
176
greater degree than do works in earlier genres.
172.
Id.
173.
The increased ease of mechanical-more specifically, digital-reproduction today for
virtually all works of expression also lends some justification for Congress's recent twenty-year
extension of the term of copyright protection. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, P.L.
105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.S. §§ 101-505 (LexisNexis
2009)). Given the ease with which their works can be copied without authorization, creators may
legitimately argue that they need greater protection under the law today than they did in predigital eras.
174.
See Dutton, supra note 121.
175.
See Web Site of Christo Jeanne Claude, http://www.christojeanneclaude.net/tg.shtml
(last visited Nov. 16, 2009). The "gates" simply traced established paths within the park; any
design resulting from the deployment of the "gates" would therefore have to be attributed to
Frederick Law Olmstead and Calvert Vaux, who designed Central Park. See id.
176.
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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The value of reproductions of original objects of Appropriation
artists like Andy Warhol and Jeff Koons is further lessened because
many of them are themselves near-literal copies of existing images or
objects.177 Paradoxically, the more literally an Appropriation artist
depicts an existing manufactured image or object, the more closely the
aesthetic value of the work is associated exclusively with the original
object rather than with reproductions of images of it.178 In other
words, if Andy Warhol had depicted images of soup tins with labels of
his own devising rather than those of Campbell's soup, photographs of
these works of Warhol's original images would arguably be more
aesthetically valuable, yet less so economically, insofar as they express
more of Warhol's personality than do his literal depictions of
preexisting expression of others. 179
It was, after all, Warhol's
capitalizing on the work of those who had built goodwill, or simply on
widespread recognition associated with certain images-e.g.,
trademarks or faces of famous people-that made his works popular
and thereby monetarily valuable.
Also paradoxical is that while the economic value of works by
Andy Warhol and other Appropriationist artists is closely tied to
original works, the creation of many Appropriationist and Conceptual
works involves less hands-on participation by the artist relative to
that of painters and sculptors working in more traditional genres.
This therefore raises the question whether assistants at a factory or
an overseas manufacturing plant may create an artist's original object
if they follow the artist's instructions. 8 0
177.
Works of artists like Claes Oldenburg, e.g., his giant lipstick, ice bag, and clothes peg
sculptures, are less aggressive than those of artists like Jeff Koons and Andy Warhol, perhaps
because they do not deliberately mock or challenge images of commercial art that are often
legally protected by copyright and trademark.
178.
See Lori Petruzzelli, Copyright Problems in Post-Modern Art, 5 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART
& ENT. L. 115, 118 (2007) (noting that a moral aspect of copyright law contradicts appropriation
art; postmodern artists use copyrighted images of others for their own financial gain).
179.
The same forces are in play in works of entertainment like TV shows and popular
movies. Ralph Nader's Commercial Alert organization drubs TV and movie studios for product
placement in their productions, implying that these are craven and commercially driven
attempts
to
brainwash
and
seduce
viewers.
See
Commercial
Alert,
http://www.commercialalert.org/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2009). It is likely, however, that many TV
and movie viewers share the flickering irritation upon seeing generic brand consumer products
appearing in productions of studios that have capitulated to the scolding of Nader and others. It
is not merely the sanctimony of such efforts that is distasteful, but also the phoniness of the
images leading us into the dreadful "uncanny valley." See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
180.
See Amy Adler, Against Moral Rights, CALIF. L. REV. 263, 297 (2009) (discussing
Andy Warhol's work as that of a "vacant" artist; "mass-produced photo -silkscreens that never
even touched the romantic hand of the artist"); Michael Glover, Jeff Koons: King of Comic Relief,
THE INDEP., July 1, 2009 ("[I]n his studio in Chelsea, New York, Koons employs up to 100 studio
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Given the consistently strong sales for the Appropriationist art

works of Andy Warhol, Jeff Koons, and Damien Hirst, this significant
intermediation by others-whether laborers working in foundries or
silk screening shops or commercial artists createing soup tins or
scrubbing pad labels-in their creations does not undermine the value
of these works as long as they are authoritatively ascribed to the

putative well-known artist. 181 Authenticity, James Gardner claims, is
more valuable than quality for Postmodern art, and encomia are

meted out by praise of a "tepid, hedging, irresolute variety" by critics
resolved "never again... to miss the boat."' 8 2 Accordingly, what
Gardner alludes to as the artist's "thaumaturgic touch" generates the

economic value of many Postmodern works, as well as the individual
or institutional owner's sense of communion with, or at least proximity

83
to, the personality of the artist himself.
Authenticity of works of Postmodern art is a concept both more

precious and also more fragile than it is for works from earlier periods.

It is both easier to forge Modern and Postmodern works than it is
earlier representational works and more difficult to distinguish
between forged and authentic works of non-representational and
assistants at a time, making all those stainless-steel replicas of inflatable toys with such loving
care, beneath Koons's ever-attentive eye."). In many respects the work of these artists is like the
ghost-written autobiographies of politicians and entertainers who, having become famous,
merely provide their name and ideas in order to sell a work ultimately created by others. See id.
181.
See Carol Vogel, Win One, Lose One for Dallas Museum, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2008
(discussing the irresistible appreciation in value that prompted a couple who had paid about $1
million for a work by Jeff Koons in 2001 to sell it for more than twenty times that price seven
years later).
182.
See GARDNER, supra note 21, at 19; see also Dolnick, supra note 71 (discussing how
prominent art experts in the 1930s and 1940s were duped into enthusiastically embracing as
authentic "Vermeers," a series of increasingly dreadful howlers from an allegedly previously
unknown "period" of the artist's career, forged by the living painter Han van Meegeren). "Each
time [one of the forgeries] won a new admirer, it made the downfall of the next connoisseur that
much more likely." Id., at 230.
183.
GARDNER, supra note 21, at 9. "It all comes down to a question of charisma, of
anointing, for which some people are willing to pay $40,000." Id. at 31. For the same reason,
people have paid large sums to acquire, for example, fripperies owned by the late Jacqueline
Kennedy Onassis; the vaguely disgusting toe shoes in which great ballerinas have performedquery why the slippers worn by male dancers are not similarly on offer on the souvenir tables at
ballet performances and mediocre watercolors by Hitler; see James Barron, Reporter's
Notebook, The Auction Aftermath: Was it Worth the Price?, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 1996, at A35.
[The collection of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis's personal effects] was a "load of
rubbish" [according toThomas Devenish, an antiques dealer with a shop on Madison
Avenue]. Perhaps the lesson to be learned from last week's touched-by-fame frenzy
over Kennedy collectibles at Sotheby's is this: Don't throw out anything, including
that tape measure (which fetched $48,875).
Id.; Dave Itzkoff, Paintings Attributed to Hitler Sold, N.Y. TIMES (ARTSBEAT), April 24, 2009
(thirteen works by Hitler recently sold in Britain for $143,000).
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Postmodern art.18 4 I could replicate one of Jeff Koons's balloon dogs
and Jeff Koons himself would likely be unable to distinguish the copy
from his original. On the other hand, even resorting to photography
and a paint-by-number technique, my copy of an Old Master painting
would be risible, even without a side-by-side comparison. Accordingly,
upon learning that his "Rembrandt" is a forgery, the crestfallen
collector would likely feel less disdain for his painting than would the
chagrined owner of an unauthorized copy of a Balloon Dog that is
utterly indistinguishable from an original. 185
In the case of Conceptual and living works of art, questions of
forgery, mechanical copying, and copyright infringement are even less
relevant than they are for Modern and Postmodern works. Apart from
the administrative and physical obstacles to reproducing or imitating
works like Wildflower Works or Christoph Bihchel's Conceptual
monstrosity Training Ground for Democracy, there are no clear
incentives to do so, economic or otherwise.18 6 The economic and
184.
This is true even of enormous works of Conceptual art. My abilities as a visual artist
are nugatory yet, if provided the same material resources and permissions as was Christo
Javacheff, I could create a copy of Gates that is indistinguishable from his original. In 2005 Alex
Matter, the son of erstwhile neighbors of Jackson Pollock, claimed to have discovered in his
parents' effects a cache of early drip paintings by Pollock. See Randy Kennedy, Scientist Presents
Case Against Possible Pollocks, N.Y. TIMES, November 29, 2007. Pollock experts and enthusiasts
readily authenticated the works as Pollock's until a forensic scientist established that pigments
used in the paintings were not available until well after Pollock's death in 1956. See id.
There have always been far more attempts to pass off spurious works of visual art than literary
and musical works by important writers and musicians. This is true in part because the
economic value of works of visual art is much more closely tied to an original artifact than is the
worth of a musical or literary work. But it is also much more challenging, perhaps impossible, to
create a spurious great work of literature or music. This may be because there is a greater
consensus among literary and music critics as to what constitutes a great work of literature or
music than there is among art critics on the same question concerning the fine arts.
185.
Abraham Bredius, one of the most respected connoisseurs of Old Master paintings in
the first half of the twentieth century, authenticated several forgeries as paintings by Vermeer.
See Dolnick, supra note 71. He continued to believe in the aesthetic quality of the works even
after it was unequivocally established that they were forgeries made by Han van Meegeren in
the 1930s and 40's. See id.; see also GARDNER, supra note 21, at 35 ('Anyone who will withdraw
his admiration from Rembrandt's Polish Rider if it turns out, as some Dutch experts now
contend, to be by a student of the master, can never have truly loved it at all. Such a viewer has
been enamored of a name, nothing more.").
186.
Training Ground for Democracy was the work at issue in a VARA dispute in
Massachusetts in which the district court held that a museum was permitted to display the
defendant's work despite his objections under VARA that the work was incomplete. See Mass.
Museum of Contemporary Art Found. v. Bichel, No. 07-30089, 2008 WL 2755842, at *13 (D.
Mass., July 11, 2008). The installation was roughly the size of a football field. See id. The First
Circuit recently overturned portions of the district court decision, finding that a genuine issue of
material fact exists as to whether the museum intentionally distorted or modified Bichel's
Training Ground, thereby violating the artist's right of integrity in this work. See Mass. Museum
of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Baichel 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 1842 (1st Cir. Mass. Jan. 27,
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cultural value of these works-and of less sprawling Conceptual
creations involving pickled animal carcasses and such-is grounded in
ideas rather than expression, and in particular manifestations of those
ideas through material objects with which the author is identified.
While I might legally create works involving ovals of wildflowers,
slaughtered animals, or inflatable toys that are virtually
indistinguishable from those of Chapman Kelley, Damien Hirst, and
Jeff Koons respectively, consumers of art will reject them as pathetic
derivations of works by artists who first successfully marketed such
works.
Unless I attempt illegally to pass off these works as
"originals," my copies will likely have little negative economic effect on
the artists I have copied. Unlike unauthorized copies of works of
genuinely copyrightable expression, my copies of the Conceptual
works-living or otherwise-may even suggest that the ideas behind
these works are worth copying or imitating in the first place, thus
boosting the economic value of the authentic works.
V. CONCLUSION

The preceding discussion has aired the difficulties in squaring
the fixation and original expression requirements of copyright in the
case of Conceptual and living works of art. The notion of extending
copyright protection to these works often borders on the untenable.
Long before Damien Hirst, Andy Warhol, and Chapman Kelley,
scientists and others had submerged animal carcasses in
formaldehyde, silk-screened images of celebrities, and grown circular
beds of wild flowers in urban spaces. The fact that these artists
elevated the status of these materials to that of art by addressing
them as such, and attaching their names to them, does not allow these
individuals to monopolize ideas and processes commonly used since
time immemorial.
The awkward rapport between copyright and Conceptual and
living works of art comes down to the fact that these works tend not to
express the personality of a particular artist, and certainly not to the
extent that copyrightable Pre-Modern works, and works rendered in
traditional media, do. Animal carcasses, silk-screened images of
photographs of celebrities, and wild flowers in ovoid beds may be
2010). The court also determined that the question whether the museum also violated the
defendant's public display copyright was a viable one that also should be considered at trial. Id.
The question of curatorial authority that this unusually acrimonious dispute has raised has been
a topic of lively discussion among artists, and museum and gallery personnel. See Randy
Kennedy, Artists Rights Act Applies in Dispute, Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2010, at C3.
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associated with certain artists at the moment, but no one could
distinguish my artfully executed animal carcasses, silk-screened
photos, and wild flower beds from those of Damien Hirst, Andy
Warhol, and Chapman Kelley respectively.
Once again, this is
because there is little authorial expression in these works; their
meaning depends largely upon the medium in which they are
rendered.
A fundamental objective of moral rights is to prohibit conduct
injurious to the artists' unique characters as revealed in their work in
order to protect their reputation and honor.18 7 There is relatively little
in most Conceptual and living works of art that could be reasonably
perceived as an expression of an author's personality, and thereby
protected as such under moral rights. 188 The deliberate destruction of
a cultivated field of flowers in order to build a profitable strip mall
might spark opprobrium like the rending of a Picasso painting into
small pieces to realize the greatest profit from the sale of the work
might generate. 8 9 Even without knowing the Picasso work-or even
disliking it-one finds objectionable the intentional destruction of an
expressive work by a renowned artist. In the case of the field of
flowers, however, one's distress can be attributed almost entirely to
the destruction of something universally appealing that naturalrather than human-forces produced. Viewers are less concerned
about the sensitivities of the individual who cultivated the flowers.
Despite the considerable "sweat of the brow" undoubtedly expended on
cultivation of the field, we do not perceive the flowering plants as
expressions or extensions of the artist/gardener's unique personality.
This Article has also touched upon another underlying purpose
of moral rights as implemented by VARA, namely the safeguarding for
posterity of a record of artistic expression over time. Conceptual and
living art works typically evade this worthy desideratum, deriving
much of their meaning and impact from their ephemerality and
composition of mixed media that resist long-term preservation.
Moreover, and somewhat ironically, VARA's moral rights that extend
only to original physical works of visual art were promulgated at the
dawn of our digital era, in which artists increasingly create virtually

187.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
188.
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
189.
See Edward Markey, Congress, Taxes and the Arts; Let Artists Have a Fair Share of
Their Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1987, at C2.
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intangible works using the infinitely malleable medium of digital
information. 190
Much of the commentary about moral rights, and VARA in
particular, applauds the provision of these rights to artists in the
United States, regretting only that what VARA provides artists may
be too little and too late. 19 1 The prevailing sentiment about the
institution of moral rights as a positive reflection on American society
is nicely expressed by one commentator as "emblematic of a civil
society that affirms the intrinsic worth of such artistic contributions to
the cultural landscape." 192 It seems equally likely, however, that the
imposition of moral rights is emblematic of a paternalist government
that is skeptical about the aesthetic sensibilities of its constituents, let
alone their ability to create and re-create valuable works of art. In
many respects, the preservationist/conservationist thrust of VARA is
fundamentally antithetical to the artistic impulse that has always
thrived on the freedom to rethink and re-create existing works of
art. 193
Moral rights have a potentially inhibiting effect upon the
production of creative works. Indeed, many mainstream, popular
works of art in various disciplines might never have been created had
moral rights been in force at the time of their creation. Leopold
Stokowski and Eugene Ormandy's luscious elephantine orchestral
arrangements of Bach's works, many of the chestnuts of opera and
ballet (typically the products of decades of musical and choreographic
accretions), and countless works of visual art that were repainted or
otherwise altered by later artists, might have been prohibited under
the integrity rubric of moral rights, and "integrity rights" in
particular. 194 Ministrations of later artists, and even attempts at
mockery, may enhance significantly creative works-for example,

190.
MIT's Media Lab is one of the most prominent exponents of the application of these
technologies in the arts. See MIT Media Lab, http://www.media.mit.edu/ (last visited Mar. 2,
2010).
191.
See e.g., Kwall, supra note 46, at 1.
192.
Burton Ong, Why Moral Rights Matter: Recognizing the Intrinsic Value of Integrity
Rights, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 297, 303 (2002).
193.
See Amy Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 263, 265 (2009) ("[T]he right
of integrity threatens art because it fails to recognize the profound artistic importance of
modifying, even destroying, works of art, and of freeing art from the control of the artist").
194.
Purists might argue that where visual arts are concerned the institution of moral
rights years, even centuries ago, might have prevented atrocities like the draperies added to
Michelangelo's Last Supper for modesty's sake by Daniele da Voltera.
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Duchamp and Leonardo's Mona Lisa.195 Conceptual and living works,
like Chapman Kelley's Wildflower Works, may not physically survive
but, even plowed back into the ground, may nonetheless hold seeds in
the collective artistic conscience for the creation of works of more
lasting significance in the future.

195.
An old suit might have received gentler treatment than an old master, one standard
account tells us. "An eighteenth-century owner of a Vermeer would not have thought a great deal
more about hiring another painter to change the picture than a housewife would think today
about having an easy chair re -upholstered." DOLNICK, supra note 71, at 98 (quoting HANS
KONINGSBERGER, THE WORLD OF VERMEER, 1967).

